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In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based
on their anticipated behavioral response to the insurance contract. Such "selection on moral hazard"
can have important implications for attempts to combat either selection or moral hazard. We explore
these issues using individual-level panel data from a single firm, which contain information about
health insurance options, choices, and subsequent claims. To identify the behavioral response to health
insurance coverage and the heterogeneity in it, we take advantage of a change in the health insurance
options offered to some, but not all of the firm's employees. We begin with descriptive evidence that
is suggestive of both heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, with individuals who select
more coverage also appearing to exhibit greater behavioral response to that coverage. To formalize
this analysis and explore its implications, we develop and estimate a model of plan choice and medical
utilization. The results from the modeling exercise echo the descriptive evidence, and allow for further
explorations of the interaction between selection and moral hazard. For example, one implication of
our estimates is that abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead one to substantially over-estimate
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Economic analysis of market failure in insurance markets tends to analyze selection and moral haz-
ard as distinct phenomena. In this paper, we explore the potential for selection on moral hazard
in insurance markets. By this we mean the possibility that moral hazard e⁄ects are heterogeneous
across individuals, and that individuals￿selection of insurance coverage is a⁄ected by their an-
ticipated behavioral response to coverage ￿their ￿moral hazard type.￿We examine these issues
empirically in the context of employer-provided health insurance in the United States. Speci￿cally,
in addition to ￿traditional￿selection based on one￿ s health risk, we also examine selection on the
expected incremental medical spending due to insurance.
Such selection on moral hazard has implications for the standard analysis of both selection and
moral hazard. For example, a standard ￿and ubiquitous ￿approach to mitigating selection in
insurance markets is risk adjustment, i.e. pricing on observable characteristics that predict one￿ s
insurance claims. However, the potential for selection on moral hazard suggests that monitoring
techniques that are usually thought of as reducing moral hazard ￿such as cost sharing that varies
across categories of claims with di⁄erential scope for moral hazard ￿ may also have important
bene￿ts in combatting adverse selection. In contrast, a standard approach to mitigating moral
hazard is to o⁄er plans with higher consumer cost sharing. But if individuals￿anticipated behavioral
response to coverage a⁄ects their propensity to select such plans, the magnitude of the behavioral
response could be much lower (or much higher) from what would be achieved if plan choices were
unrelated to the behavioral response. As we discuss in more detail below, not only the existence
of selection on moral hazard but also the sign of any relationship between anticipated behavioral
response and demand for higher coverage is ex ante ambiguous. Ultimately, these are empirical
questions. To our knowledge, however, there is no empirical work on selection on moral hazard in
insurance markets.
Health insurance provides a particularly interesting setting in which to explore these issues. Both
selection and moral hazard have been well-documented in the employer-provided health insurance
market in the United States. Moreover, given the extensive government involvement in health
insurance, as well as the concern about the size and rapid growth of the health care sector, there
is considerable academic and public policy interest in how to mitigate both selection and moral
hazard in this market.
Recognition of the possibility of selection on moral hazard, however, highlights potentially
important limitations of analyzing these problems in isolation. For example, the sizable empirical
literature on the likely spending reductions that could be achieved through higher consumer cost
sharing has intentionally focused on isolating and exploring exogenous changes in cost sharing ￿
such as those induced by the famous Rand experiment (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse, 1993).
Yet, the very same feature that solves the causal inference problem ￿namely randomization (or
attempts to approximate it in the subsequent quasi-experimental literature on this topic) ￿removes
the endogenous choice element. It thus abstracts, by design, from any selection on moral hazard,
which could have important implications for the spending reductions achieved through o⁄ering
1plans with higher consumer cost sharing, especially since substantial plan choice is now the norm
not only in private health insurance but also increasingly in public health insurance programs, such
as Medicare Part D.
We explore these issues using data on the U.S. workers at Alcoa Inc., a large multinational pro-
ducer of aluminum and related products. We observe individual-level data on the health insurance
options, choices, and subsequent medical utilization of employees (and their dependents); we also
observe relatively rich demographic information, including health risk scores. Crucially for iden-
tifying and estimating moral hazard, we observe variation in the health insurance options o⁄ered
to di⁄erent groups of workers. In an e⁄ort to control health spending, Alcoa began introducing a
new set of health insurance options in 2004, designed to encourage employees to move into plans
with substantially higher consumer cost sharing. We calculate that, if there were no change in
behavior, the move from the original options to the new options would have increased the average
share of spending paid out of pocket from 13 to 28 percent. We exploit the fact that, for unionized
employees, the introduction of the new health insurance options was phased in gradually, as the
new health insurance options could only be introduced when existing union contracts expired.
We begin by providing descriptive and motivating evidence on moral hazard in our setting.
Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates suggest that the new options are associated with an average
reduction in total medical spending of about $600 (11 percent) per employee. We ￿nd evidence
consistent with heterogeneity in this moral hazard e⁄ect, such as larger spending reductions for
older relative to younger employees, and for sicker relative to healthier employees. We also present
suggestive evidence of selection on moral hazard, with those who initially selected more coverage
appearing to have a greater behavioral response to a change in coverage.
In order to formalize the analysis of selection on moral hazard and to explore some of its
implications, we develop a utility-maximizing model of individual health insurance plan choices
and claims. This allows us to precisely de￿ne ￿moral hazard￿ (a term whose usage is far from
standardized in the literature) and, within the context of our model, identify selection on it. The
model draws heavily on a relatively standard two-period framework for modeling health insurance
demand and subsequent medical care utilization (as in, e.g., Cardon and Hendel, 2001). In the
￿rst period, a risk-averse expected-utility-maximizing individual makes optimal coverage choices
based on his risk aversion, health expectations, and anticipated behavioral response to the contract
choice. In the second period, health is realized and individuals make optimal medical expenditure
decisions based on their realized health as well as on their chosen coverage. It is this last e⁄ect which
generates what we term moral hazard, with a larger responsiveness corresponding to a higher ￿moral
hazard type.￿We allow for unobserved heterogeneity along three dimensions: health expectations,
risk aversion, and moral hazard, and for ￿ exible correlation across these three.
An individual￿ s optimal health insurance choice involves a trade-o⁄of higher up-front premiums
in exchange for lower ex-post out-of-pocket spending. All else equal, willingness to pay for coverage
is increasing in the individual￿ s health expectation and his risk aversion; these are standard results.
In addition, in our model, all else equal, willingness to pay for coverage is increasing in the individ-
ual￿ s moral hazard type: individuals with a greater behavioral response to coverage bene￿t more
2from more coverage, since they will consume more care as a result. This is the ￿selection on moral
hazard￿comparative static that is the focus of our paper. Empirically, however, the sign (let alone
the magnitude) of any selection on moral hazard is ambiguous and depends on the heterogeneity
in moral hazard as well as the correlation between moral hazard type and the other primitives that
a⁄ect health insurance choice, expected health and risk aversion.
We use this model, together with the data on individual plan options, plan choice, and subse-
quent medical spending, to recover the joint distribution of individuals￿(unobserved) health type,
risk aversion, and moral hazard type. The econometric model and its identi￿cation share many
properties with some of our earlier work on insurance (Cohen and Einav, 2007; Einav, Finkelstein,
and Schrimpf, 2010). The inclusion of moral hazard and heterogeneity in it is new. The panel
structure of the data and the staggered timing of the introduction of the new coverage options are
key in allowing us to identify this new element. The model is estimated using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo Gibbs sampler, and its ￿t appears reasonable.
Qualitatively, the model￿ s results are consistent with the descriptive evidence of selection on
moral hazard. We ￿nd that individuals who exhibit a greater behavioral response to coverage are
more likely to choose higher coverage plans. Quantitatively, we estimate substantial heterogeneity
in moral hazard and selection on it. We focus on the counterfactual of moving from the most
comprehensive to the least comprehensive of the new options ￿essentially moving them from a no
deductible plan to a high ($3,000 for family coverage) deductible plan. In terms of heterogeneity in
moral hazard, we ￿nd that the standard deviation across individuals of the spending reduction that
would be achieved by this change in plans is more than twice the average. In terms of selection on
moral hazard, we ￿nd that for determining the choice between these two plans, selection on moral
hazard is roughly as important as ￿traditional￿ selection on health risk, and considerably more
important than selection on risk aversion.
We use the model to examine some of the implications of the selection on moral hazard we
detect for spending and for welfare. In terms of spending, our results suggest that if we were to
introduce the high deductible plan in a setting where previously there was only the no deductible
option, and price it so that 10 percent of the population chooses the high deductible plan, spending
for those who choose the high deductible plan would fall by approximately $130 per person. By
contrast, were we to ignore selection on moral hazard and assume that the 10 percent who chose
the high deductible plan were randomly drawn, we would have estimated a spending reduction for
those moved to the high deductible plan more than 2.5 times as large, at about $350 per person.
In terms of welfare, we estimate that about two-thirds of the welfare gain that can be achieved in
our setting by perfect risk adjustment that eliminates adverse selection could be achieved if better
monitoring technologies eliminated selection on moral hazard. While our quantitative estimates are
speci￿c to our setting and our modeling choices, they nonetheless provide an interesting example of
the potential for selection on moral hazard to play a non-trivial role in the analysis of both selection
and moral hazard.
Our paper is related to several distinct literatures. As previously noted, our modeling approach
is closely related to that of Cardon and Hendel (2001), which is also the approach taken by Bajari
3et al. (2010), Carlin and Town (2010), and Handel (2010) in modeling health insurance plan choice.
Like us, all of these papers have allowed for selection based on expected health risk. Our paper
di⁄ers in our focus on identifying and estimating moral hazard ￿and in particular heterogeneous
moral hazard ￿and in examining the relationship between moral hazard type and plan choice. From
a methodological perspective, we also di⁄er from these and many other discrete choice models in
that we do not allow for a choice-speci￿c, i.i.d. error term, which does not seem appealing given
the vertically rankable nature of our choices.
Our analysis of the spending reduction associated with changes in cost sharing is related to a
sizable experimental and quasi-experimental literature in health economics analyzing the impact
of higher consumer cost sharing on spending. The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences exercises with which
we begin our analysis is very much in the spirit of this literature, which searches for identifying
variation in consumer health plans to isolate the causal impact of consumer cost sharing on health
spending. Our central di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimate translates into an implied arc elasticity
of medical spending with respect to the average out-of-pocket cost share of about -0.14. This
is broadly similar to the ￿ndings of the existing experimental and quasi-experimental literature,
which tends to produce arc elasticities in the range of -0.1 to -0.4, with the ￿central￿Rand elasticity
estimate of -0.2 (see Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010) for a recent review). However, our
subsequent exploration of heterogeneity in this average moral hazard e⁄ect and selection on it
suggests the need for caution in using such estimates, which do not account for endogenous plan
selection, for forecasting the likely spending e⁄ects of introducing the option of plans with higher
consumer cost sharing. It also suggests that one can embed the basic identi￿cation approach of
the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences framework in a model that allows for and investigates such endogenous
selection.
Our examination of selection on moral hazard is motivated in part by the growing empirical liter-
ature demonstrating that selection in insurance markets often occurs on dimensions other than risk.
This literature has tended to abstract from moral hazard, and focused on selection on preferences,
such as risk aversion (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cohen and Einav, 2007), cognition (Fang,
Keane, and Silverman, 2008), or desire for wealth after death (Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf,
2010). Our exploration of selection on moral hazard highlights another potential dimension of se-
lection and one that, we believe, has particularly interesting implications for contract design (in
contexts where moral hazard is important). For many questions the extent to which selection occurs
on the basis of expected health type or risk aversion does not matter (see, e.g., Einav, Finkelstein,
and Cullen, 2010). However, as we illustrate in this paper, for questions regarding the design of
contracts to reduce selection and the implications of contract design for spending, the extent to
which selection is based on moral hazard can be important.
Despite its potential importance, we are not aware of any empirical work attempting to identify
and analyze selection on moral hazard in insurance markets.1 The basic idea of selection on moral
1Karlan and Zinman (2009) observe that selection in a credit market may be on unobserved risk and/or on
anticipated e⁄ort, although they do not empirically distinguish between the two.
4hazard, however, is not unique to us. Similar ideas have appeared in several other contexts. For
example, in the context of appliance choices and phone plan choices, respectively, Dubin and
McFadden (1984) and Miravete (2003) estimate models in which the choice is allowed to depend
on subsequent utilization, which in turn may respond to the utilization price. One general way to
think about the concept of selection on moral hazard is in the context of estimating a treatment
e⁄ect of insurance coverage on medical expenditure. Within such a framework, selection on health
risk would be equivalent to heterogeneity in (and selection on) the level (or constant term in a
regression of medical spending on insurance coverage), while selection on moral hazard can be
thought of as heterogeneity in (and selection on) the slope coe¢ cient. Indeed, Heckman, Urzua
and Vytlacil (2006) present an econometric examination of the properties of IV estimators when
individuals select into treatment in part based on their anticipated response to the treatment, a
phenomenon they refer to as ￿essential heterogeneity.￿They subsequently apply these ideas in the
context of the returns to education in Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2010).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 presents
descriptive evidence of moral hazard, heterogeneity in moral hazard, and selection on it in our data.
Section 4 develops a two-period model of an individual￿ s health insurance plan choice and spending
decisions. Building on this model, Section 5 presents the econometric speci￿cation and describes
its identi￿cation and estimation, and Section 6 presents our results, as well as illustrates some of
their implications for spending and welfare. The last section concludes.
2 Setting and Data
We study health insurance choices and medical care utilization of the U.S.-based workers (and their
dependents) at Alcoa, Inc., a large multinational producer of aluminum and related products. Our
main analysis is based on data from 2003 and 2004, although for some of the analyses we extend
the sample through 2006.
In 2004, in an e⁄ort to control health care spending by encouraging employees to move into plans
with substantially higher consumer cost sharing, Alcoa introduced a new set of health insurance
PPO options. The new options were introduced gradually to di⁄erent employees based on their union
a¢ liation, since new bene￿ts could only be introduced when an existing union contract expired.
The staggered timing in the transition from one set of insurance options to another provides a
plausibly exogenous source of variation that can help us identify the impact of health insurance on
medical care utilization, which is what we mean throughout by the term ￿moral hazard.￿
Our data contain the menu of health insurance options available to each employee, the em-
ployee￿ s coverage choices, and detailed, claim-level information on his (and any covered depen-
dents￿ ) medical care utilization and expenditures for the year.2 The data also contain relatively
rich demographic information (compared to typical claims data), including the employee￿ s union
2Health insurance choices are made in November, during the open enrollment period, and apply for the subsequent
calendar year. They can be changed during the year only if the employee has a qualifying event, which is not common.
5a¢ liation, employment type (hourly or salary), age, race, gender, annual earnings, job tenure at
the company, and the number and ages of other insured family members. In addition, we obtained
a summary proxy of an individual￿ s health based on software that predicts future medical spending
on the basis of previous years￿detailed medical diagnoses and claims, as well as basic demographics
(age and gender); importantly for our purposes, this generated ￿health risk score￿is not a function
of the individual￿ s coverage choice.3
Sample de￿nition and demographics Alcoa has about 45,000 active employees per year. We
exclude about 15 percent of the sample whose data are not suited to our analytical framework.4
Given the source of variation used to identify moral hazard, we concentrate on the approximately
one third of Alcoa workers who are unionized.5 We further exclude the approximately two thirds
of unionized workers that are covered by the Master Steel Workers￿agreement. These workers
faced only one PPO option which was left unchanged over our sample period. Finally, we exclude
the approximately 10 percent of unionized employees who choose HMOs or who opt out of Alcoa-
provided insurance, thus limiting our sample to employees enrolled in one of Alcoa￿ s PPO plans.6
Our baseline sample therefore consists of the approximately 4,000 unionized workers (each year)
not covered by the Master agreement. These workers belong to one of 28 di⁄erent unions. Table
1 (top row) provides some descriptive statistics on the demographic characteristics of our baseline
sample in 2003. Our sample is 72 percent white, 84 percent male, with an average age of 41,
3This is a relatively sophisticated way of predicting medical spending as it takes into account the di⁄erential
persistence of di⁄erent types of medical claims (e.g., diabetes vs. car accident) in addition to overall utilization,
demographics, and a rich set of interactions among these measures. The particular software we use is a risk adjustment
tool called DXCG risk solution which was developed by Verisk Health and is used by, among other organizations, the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid services in determining reimbursement rates in Medicare Advantage. See Bundorf,
Levin, and Mahoney (2009), Carlin and Town (2010), and Handel (2010) for other examples of academic uses of this
type of predictive diagnostic software.
4The biggest reduction in sample size comes from excluding workers who are not at the company for the entire
year (for whom we do not observe complete annual medical expenditures). In addition, we exclude employees who
are outside the traditional bene￿t structure of the company (for example because they were working for a recently
acquired company with a di⁄erent (grandfathered) bene￿t structure); for such employees we do not have detailed
information on their insurance options and choices. We also exclude a small number of employees because of missing
data or data discrepancies.
5Approximately 70 percent of Alcoa workers are hourly employees, and approximately half of these are unionized.
Salaried workers are not unionized.
6As is typical in claims data sets, we lack information for employees who choose an HMO or who opt out of
employer coverage on both the details of their insurance coverage and their medical care utilization. Of course,
this raises potential sample selection concerns. Reassuringly, as we show in Appendix A, the change in PPO health
insurance options does not appear to be associated with a statistically or economically signi￿cant change in the
fraction of employees who choose one of these excluded options.
6average annual income of about $31,000, and an average tenure of about 10 years at the company.
Approximately one quarter of the sample has single (employee only) coverage, while the rest also
cover additional dependents. The health risk score is calibrated to be interpreted as predicted
medical spending relative to a randomly drawn person under 65 in the nationally representative
population; Table 1 indicates that, on average, individuals in our sample have predicted medical
spending that is about 5 percent lower than this benchmark.
The remaining rows of Table 1 show summary statistics for four di⁄erent groups of employees
based on when they were switched to the new bene￿t options (i.e. four di⁄erent treatment groups);
we discuss this comparison when we present our di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences strategy and results below.
As noted, our main analysis is based on the 2003 and 2004 data (7,570 employee-years and
4,477 unique employees). We exclude the 2005 and 2006 data from our primary analysis because
it introduces two challenges for estimation of our plan choice model. First, the relative price of
comprehensive coverage on the new options was raised substantially in 2005 and raised further in
2006, yet remarkably few employees already in the new option set changed their plans. This is
consistent with substantial evidence of inertial behavior in health insurance plan choices (Handel,
2010; Carlin and Town, 2010). Rather than modeling this behavior (e.g., as switching costs), we
prefer instead to restrict the data to a time period where they are less central to understanding
plan choices. Of course, plan choice for individuals under the old options may also re￿ ect inertial
factors (indeed, as we will show in Table 3 below, plan switching is extremely rare (about 1 percent)
for employees whose options did not change in 2004), but the pricing under the old options is not
changing during our sample period, making any such inertia less central for trying to understand
current choices. Second, the pricing in 2006 is such that it is hard to rationalize some of the
plan choices in which there is considerable mass, without extending the model to include some
combination of switching costs, additional plan features, and/or biased expectations; again, we
prefer to avoid these issues in the context of our primary question of interest.
The main drawback to limiting the data to 2003 and 2004 is that less than one-￿fth of our sample
were o⁄ered the new bene￿ts starting in 2004, while another half of the sample was transitioned
to the new bene￿ts in 2005 and 2006 (Table 1, column (1)). Therefore, for some of the descriptive
evidence we report in this section (which does not require an explicit model of plan choice) we use
data from 2003-2006. This sample produces qualitatively similar descriptive results to the 2003-
2004 sample, but the larger sample size allows for greater precision (and hence probing) in our
descriptive exercises.
Medical spending We have detailed, claim-level information on medical expenditures and uti-
lization. Our primary use of these data is to construct annual total medical spending for each
employee (and his covered dependents). In Appendix A, we also use these data in a less aggregated
way to break out spending by category (i.e., doctor￿ s o¢ ce, outpatient, inpatient, and other).
Figure 1 graphs the distribution of medical spending for our sample. We show the distribution
separately for the approximately three-quarters of our sample with non-single coverage and the
remainder with single employee coverage; not surprisingly, average spending is substantially higher
7in the former group. Across all employees, the average annual spending (on themselves and their
covered dependents) is about $5,200.7 As is typical, medical expenditures are extremely skewed.
For example, for non-single coverage, average spending ($6,100) is about 2.5 times greater than the
median spending ($2,400), about 4 percent of our baseline sample has no spending, while each of
the employees in the top decile spends over $13,000.
Health insurance options and choices An attractive feature of our setting is that the PPO
plans in both the original and new regimes di⁄er (within and across regimes) only in their consumer
cost sharing requirements. They are identical on all non-cost sharing features, such as the network
de￿nition. Table 2 summarizes the original and new plan options and the fraction of employees who
choose each option in our baseline sample. Employees may choose from up to four coverage tiers:
single (employee only) coverage, or one of three non-single coverage tiers (employee plus spouse,
employee plus children, or family). In our analysis we take coverage tier as given, assuming that it
is primarily driven by family structure.8
There were three PPO options under the old bene￿ts and ￿ve entirely di⁄erent PPO options
under the new bene￿ts. Because there was no option of ￿staying in your existing plan￿￿the ￿ve new
options were all distinct from the three old options in both their name and their design ￿individuals
did not have the option of passively being defaulted into their existing coverage. We show in Table
3 below that plan choices for those who are switched to the new options are also consistent with
the notion of ￿active￿choices. As a result, we suspect that defaults did not play an important role
in the choice of new bene￿ts. Indeed, although option 4 was the default coverage option, it was not
the most common choice (Table 2).9 In the robustness section we provide additional analysis that
suggests that the importance of defaults for our analysis is negligible.
The primary change from the old to the new bene￿ts was to o⁄er plans with higher deductibles
and to increase the lowest out-of-pocket maximum.10 As shown in the table, under the new options
there was a shift to plans with higher consumer cost sharing. Under the old options virtually all
7A little over one quarter of total spending is in doctor o¢ ces, about one third is for inpatient hospitalizations,
and about one third is for outpatient services. About half of the remaining four percent of spending is accounted for
by emergency room visits.
8Employee premiums vary across the four coverage tiers according to ￿xed ratios. Cost sharing provisions di⁄er
only between single and non-single coverage. Speci￿cally, for a given PPO, deductibles and out-of-pocket maxima
are twice as great for any non-single coverage tier as they are for single coverage. As shown in Table 1, about one
quarter of the sample chooses single coverage. Within non-single coverage, slightly over half choose family coverage,
30 percent choose employee plus spouse, and about 16 percent choose employee plus children (not shown).
9Also consistent with a large amount of ￿active￿ choices, although the old option 2 and the new option 5 are
identical in all the aspects we model, only about half the employees who chose the old option 2 choose the new option
5, presumably re￿ ecting the change in choice set (including relative pricing).
10At a point in time, prices within a coverage tier vary slightly across employees (in the range of several hundred
dollars) under either the old or new options, depending on the employee￿ s a¢ liation (see Einav, Finkelstein, and
Cullen (2010) for more detail). Premiums were constant over time under the old options; as mentioned, under the
8employees faced no deductible. Looking at employees with non-single coverage in Panel B (patterns
for single coverage employees are similar), about two ￿fths faced a $2,000 out-of-pocket maximum
while three-￿fths faced a $5,000 out-of-pocket maximum. By contrast, under the new options, about
a third of the employees faced a deductible, and all of them faced a high out-of-pocket maximum
of at least $5,000 for non-single coverage.11
As one way to summarize the di⁄erences in consumer cost sharing under the di⁄erent plans,
we used the plan rules to simulate the average share of medical spending that would be paid out
of pocket (counterfactually for most individuals) under di⁄erent plans for all 2003 employees and
their realized medical claims.12 Less generous plans correspond to those with higher consumer cost
sharing. The results are summarized in the third row of each panel of Table 2. Combining the
information on average enrollment shares of the di⁄erent plans with our calculation of the average
cost sharing in the di⁄erent plans, we estimate that, holding spending behavior constant, the change
from the original options to the new options on average would have more than doubled the share
of spending paid out of pocket, from about 13 to 28 percent.13
The plan descriptions in Table 2, and the subsequent parameterization of our model in Section
5, abstract from some additional details. First, while we model all plans as having a 10 percent
in-network consumer coinsurance after the plan deductible is reached for all care, under the old
options doctor visits and ER visits had in fact co-pays rather than coinsurance.14 Second, we
have summarized (and modeled) the in-network features only. All of the plans have higher (less
generous) consumer cost sharing for care consumed out of network rather than in network. We
new options, premiums were increased substantially (and cross-employee di⁄erences were removed) in 2005 and 2006
(not shown).
11A $5,000 ($2,500) out-of-pocket maximum for non-single (single) coverage is rarely binding. With no deductible
and a 10 percent consumer cost sharing, the employee must have $50,000 ($25,000) in total annual medical expen-
ditures to hit this out-of-pocket maximum. Using the realized claims, we calculate that only about one percent of
the employees would hit the out-of-pocket maximum in a given year. By contrast, under the old options the lowest
out-of-pocket maximum was $2,000 ($1,000) for non-single (single) coverage, corresponding to total annual spending
of $20,000 ($10,000). Using the same realized claims distribution, we calculate that about 5.5 percent of employees
would hit this out-of-pocket maximum.
12By constructing (counterfactually) the share of a given (constant) set of medical expenditures that would be
covered by di⁄erent plans, we are able to construct a measure of the relative comprehensiveness of di⁄erent plans
that is purged of the confounding factors of selection and moral hazard that in￿ uence the actual out-of-pocket share
of medical expenditures covered by each plan.
13These numbers are based on the average out of pocket shares by plan calculated in Table 2 and the plan shares
for the 2003-2006 sample (not shown). Using the 2003-2004 sample￿ s plan shares (shown in Table 2) we estimate that
the move to the new options would on average raise the average out of pocket share from 12 to 25 percent.
14Speci￿cally they had doctor and ER co-pays of $15 and $75 respectively, or $10 and $50 depending on the plan.
In practice, given the average costs of a doctor visit ($115) and an ER visit ($730) in our data, the switch from the
co-pay to coinsurance did not make much di⁄erence for predicted out-of-pocket spending.
9choose to model only the in-network rules (where more than 95% of spending occurs) in order to
avoid having to model the decision to go in or out of network. Third, while in general the new
options were designed to have higher consumer cost sharing, a wider set of preventive care services
(including regular physicals, screenings, and well baby care) were covered with no consumer cost
sharing under the new options; these preventive services account for less than 2 percent of medical
spending in our sample. Finally, the least comprehensive of the new options (option 1) includes a
health reimbursement account (HRA) into which the employer makes tax-free contributions that the
employee can draw on to pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses, or roll over for subsequent years.
In the robustness section we explore alternative models that try to account for these distinctive
features of this option.
Table 3 shows plan transitions for employees who were in the old options in both 2003 and
2004 and for employees who were switched from the old to the new options in 2004. Two main
features emerge. First, almost all employees (almost 99 percent) under the old options in both
years maintain the same coverage, which is to be expected given that the options and their prices
did not change (but could also be driven by inertia in plan choices). Second, for those who get
switched to the new options in 2004, there is far from a perfect correlation in the rank ordering of
their choices under the old and new options. Over 40 percent of individuals move from the highest
possible coverage under the old option to something other than the highest possible coverage under
the new options, or vice versa. This is consistent with individuals making more ￿active￿choices
under the new options, as suggested earlier.
3 Descriptive Evidence of Moral Hazard
We start by presenting some basic descriptive evidence of moral hazard in our setting. The analysis
provides a feel for the basic identi￿cation strategy for moral hazard. It also provides suggestive
evidence of heterogeneity in moral hazard and selection on it. At the same time, our descriptive
exercise points to the di¢ culty in identifying heterogeneity in moral hazard and selection on it
without a formal model of moral hazard. The suggestive evidence as well as its important limitations
together motivate our subsequent modeling exercise, which we turn to in the next section.
Descriptive estimates of moral hazard We start with the (easier) empirical task of document-
ing the existence of some form of asymmetric information in our data. Table 4 reports realized
medical spending as a function of insurance coverage in our baseline sample. The analysis ￿which
is in the spirit of Chiappori and Salanie￿ s (2000) ￿positive correlation test￿ ￿shows that under
either the old or new options individuals who choose more comprehensive coverage have systemati-
cally higher (contemporaneous) spending. This is consistent with the presence of adverse selection
and/or moral hazard in our data.
To identify moral hazard in the data separately from adverse selection, we take advantage of
the variation in the option set faced by di⁄erent groups of employees. Table 5 presents this basic
10di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences evidence of moral hazard for our baseline sample. Speci￿cally, we show
various moments of the spending distribution in 2003 and in 2004 for the control group (employees
who are covered by the old options in both years) and the treatment group (employees who are
switched to the new options in 2004). The results show a strikingly consistent pattern across all the
various moments of the spending distribution: spending falls for the treatment group, and tends to
increase slightly for the control group.
The results in Table 5 also suggest slight di⁄erences in 2003 spending for the treatment group
relative to the control group, although these cross-sectional di⁄erences are, for the most part, small
relative to the changes over time within the treatment group. More generally, the bottom four
rows of Table 1 indicate di⁄erences in demographics as well as initial spending across all four of the
treatment groups. In Appendix A we therefore explore in depth the sensitivity of our di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences estimates to controlling for observable di⁄erences across employees. We also investigate
in the Appendix the validity of the underlying identifying assumption behind the di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences estimates, namely that absent the changes in health insurance bene￿ts these di⁄erent
groups would have experienced similar trends in health spending. We ￿nd these results generally
quite reassuring.
Table 6 summarizes our central di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates (which we then explore in
more detail in Appendix A). Columns (1)-(3) show the results for our baseline 2003-2004 sample.
The ￿rst column shows the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimate when the dependent variable is mea-
sured in dollars. Such a speci￿cation assumes that the moral hazard e⁄ects of insurance occurs in
levels. This is consistent with the model we write down in the next section. However, both because
it is possible that the moral hazard e⁄ect is in fact proportional to spending, and because one
may be concerned about the results being driven by a few outliers with extremely high spending,
in columns (2) and (3) we investigate speci￿cations that give rise to a proportional moral hazard
e⁄ect. Given the large fraction of employees with zero spending, we cannot estimate the model in
simple logs. Instead, in column (2) we report estimates from a speci￿cation in which spending, m,
is measured by log(1+m),15 and column (3) reports a quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson model.16
The results suggest that the move to the new options is associated with an economically signi￿cant
decline in spending.
An important concern about the results in columns (1)-(3) is that they are not very precise.
This is re￿ ected in the large standard errors of the estimate, and in the relatively large di⁄erences
in the quantitative implications of the di⁄erent speci￿cations. This lack of precision is driven by
the fact that only about one-￿fth of the employees in our sample are switched to the new bene￿ts
in 2004 (Table 1, column (1)). Therefore, in columns (4)-(6) we report analogous estimates from
15Given that almost all individuals spend at least several hundred dollars (Figure 1), the results are not sensitive
to the choice of 1 relative to some other small numbers. For the same reason, the estimated coe¢ cients can be
approximately interpreted as elasticities.
16The QMLE-Poisson model requires only that the conditional mean be correctly speci￿ed for the estimates to be
consistent. See, e.g., Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 19) for more discussion.
11the 2003-2006 sample, during which more than half of the employees switched to the new bene￿ts.
As expected, the standard error of our estimates decreases substantially, and the quantitative
implications of the results become much more stable across speci￿cations. The estimated spending
reduction is now statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level, with the point estimates suggesting
a reduction of spending of about $600 (column (4)) or 11-17% (columns (5) and (6)). In Appendix
A we show that the reduction in spending appears to arise entirely through reduced doctor and
outpatient spending, with no evidence of a discernible e⁄ect on inpatient spending.17
Following common practice in this literature, we can compute a back-of-the-envelope elasticity
of health spending with respect to the out-of-pocket cost sharing by combining these estimates of
the spending reduction with the estimates in Table 2 of the average cost sharing of di⁄erent plans
(holding behavior constant). Given the distribution of employees across the di⁄erent plans, the
numbers in Table 2 suggest that the change from the old options to the new options should increase
the average share of out-of-pocket spending from 12.6 percent to 28.4 percent in the 2003-2006
sample. Combining the point estimate of a $591 reduction in spending (Table 6, column (4)) with
our calculation of the increase in cost sharing, our estimates imply an arc elasticity of medical
spending with respect to out-of-pocket cost sharing of about -0.14.18 This is broadly similar to
the widely used Rand experiment arc-elasticity of medical spending of -0.2 (Manning et al., 1987;
Keeler and Rolph, 1988). Subsequent studies that have used quasi-experimental variation in health
insurance plans have tended to estimate elasticities of medical spending in the range of -0.1 to
-0.4.19
Heterogeneity in moral hazard A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for selection on
moral hazard is that there is heterogeneity in individuals￿responsiveness to consumer cost shar-
ing. To our knowledge, the experimental and quasi-experimental literature in health economics
analyzing the impact of higher consumer cost sharing on spending has focused on average e⁄ects
and largely ignored potential heterogeneity. This may in part re￿ ect the fact that because health
realizations are, by their nature, partially random, testing for heterogeneity in moral hazard is
not trivial. It is particularly challenging without an explicit model of the nature of moral hazard
which can, for example, provide guidance as to whether the e⁄ect of consumer cost sharing is ad-
17The reduction in outpatient spending appears to occur entirely on the intensive margin, while the reduction in
doctor spending may occur entirely through a reduction in doctor visits.
18We compute an arc elasticity, in which the proportional change in spending (and in consumer cost sharing) is
calculated relative to the average observed across the old and new options, so that our results are more directly
comparable with the existing literature. The arc elasticity is calculated as
(q2￿q1)=(q1+q2)=2
(p2￿p1)=(p1+p2)=2 where p denotes the
average consumer cost sharing rate. For the 2003-2006 sample, the proportional change in spending and cost sharing
is 11% and 77%, respectively.
19See Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010), who provide a recent review of some of this literature as well as one
of the estimated elasticities.
12ditive or multiplicative.20 In addition, because changes in health insurance change the consumer￿ s
(non-linear) budget set and individuals will vary as to where on the budget set they are, a careful
examination of heterogeneity in moral hazard involves modeling this heterogeneity in the ￿treat-
ment￿associated with a change in health insurance plan; see Einav and Finkelstein (2011) for an
exploration of related issues. In our speci￿c context, a further subtlety is that it is the menu of
plan options that varies in a quasi-experimental fashion, rather than the plan itself, making the
actual individual coverage endogenous. All of these considerations motivate our formal modeling
of moral hazard and of plan choice in the next section.
We begin, however, by ￿rst presenting some suggestive evidence in the data of what might
plausibly be heterogeneity in moral hazard. One approach is to look at the distribution of spending
changes across individuals. In the context of a model with an additive separable moral hazard
e⁄ect (such as the one we develop in the next section), homogeneous moral hazard would imply
a constant (additive) change in spending for all individuals. The results in Table 5 showing the
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates at di⁄erent quantiles of the distribution indicate that the change
in spending associated with the change in insurance options is higher at higher quantiles. Due to
censoring at zero this is mechanically true (and therefore not particularly informative) at the lower
spending quantiles, but even comparing quantiles above the median shows a marked pattern of
larger e⁄ects at larger quantiles.21 Of course, since individuals may move quantiles with the change
in options, this is not evidence of heterogeneity per se, but it is nonetheless suggestive.
Table 7 presents additional suggestive evidence of heterogeneous (level or proportional) moral
hazard e⁄ects by reporting the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates separately for observably di⁄erent
groups of workers. Speci￿cally, we show the estimated reduction in spending associated with the
change from the old to the new options separately for workers above and below the median age
(panel A), male vs. female workers (panel B), workers above and below the median income (panel
C), and workers of above and below median health risk score (panel D). We discuss the ￿nal panel
(panel E) later.
A di¢ culty with trying to infer heterogeneity in moral hazard from heterogeneous changes
in spending across demographic groups is that di⁄erential changes in spending may re￿ ect either
heterogeneous treatment e⁄ects (the object of interest) or heterogeneous treatments (i.e., greater
20Without such a model, a nonparametric test for whether there is heterogeneity in moral hazard e⁄ects is possible
to construct when there is no choice in health insurance and an exogenous change in health insurance coverage. In
this case, a nonparametric test can be developed by relying on the panel nature of the data and comparing the
joint distribution (before and after the introduction of a new bene￿t) of the quantiles of medical spending for the
treatment group relative to the control group; the change in individual￿ s spending rank (i.e. the joint distribution of
the quantiles of spending) in the control group provides an estimate of the variation in ranking across individuals in
their spending to expect simply from the random nature of health realizations. However, when an endogenous plan
choice is present (as in our setting), a nonparametric test for heterogeneity in moral hazard is more challenging.
21Kowalski (2010) ￿nds similar patterns in her quantile treatment estimates using a di⁄erent identi￿cation strategy
in a di⁄erent ￿rm.
13changes in cost sharing for some groups than for others, given their endogenous plan choices).
Separating these two requires a more explicit model of plan choices as well as how the cost sharing
features of the plan a⁄ect the spending decision. Again, we do this formally in the context of
the model we develop below. However, to get a loose sense of the variation in the change in cost
sharing across groups, in columns (5) and (6) we report the average out of pocket share for each
demographic group under the old and new options; column (7) reports the increase in the average
out of pocket share associated with the change in options, which provides a metric by which to
measure the treatment.
The estimates in Table 7 ￿while generally not precise ￿are suggestive of heterogenous moral
hazard. The top two rows show that the reduction in spending associated with the new options is
an order of magnitude higher for older workers than for younger workers, despite what appears to
be a somewhat larger increase in the average out of pocket share for the younger workers (column
(7)). Panel B indicates similar point estimates for male and female workers, despite the fact that
males experience a larger increase in the out of pocket share. Similarly, panel C indicates similar
point estimates for higher and lower income workers, but a somewhat larger increase in the out of
pocket share for higher income workers. Finally, panel D indicates that the less healthy experience a
substantial decline in spending while the more healthy experience no statistically detectable decline
in spending, despite a larger increase in the out of pocket share for the more healthy.
While many of the estimates are quite imprecise, the results are suggestive of larger behavioral
responses to consumer cost sharing for older workers than younger workers and for sicker workers
than healthier workers, and perhaps also for female workers relative to male workers and for lower
income workers relative to higher income workers. While suggestive, this type of exercise also points
to the limitations of inferring heterogeneity in moral hazard across individuals from such simple
descriptive evidence. For example, the parameterization of the ￿treatment￿e⁄ects by the average
out of pocket share obscures both the endogenous plan choice from within the menu of options as
well as the di⁄erent expected (end of year) marginal price faced by di⁄erent individuals in the same
plan based on their health status, which in principle should guide their utilization decisions.
Selection on moral hazard As discussed in the introduction, the pure comparative static of
selection on moral hazard (holding all other factors that determine plan choice constant) is that
individuals with a greater behavioral response to coverage (i.e., a larger moral hazard e⁄ect) will
choose greater coverage. We therefore look for descriptive evidence of the relationship between
an individual￿ s behavioral responsiveness to coverage and their coverage choice. Some suggestive
evidence of selection on moral hazard comes from the fact that older workers and sicker workers ￿
whom we saw in Panel A may have larger moral hazard e⁄ects than younger workers and healthier
workers respectively ￿also choose more comprehensive insurance under both the new and original
plan options (not shown). Of course, older and sicker workers also have higher medical spending
so that it is di¢ cult to know from this evidence alone whether their insurance choice is driven by
their expected health or their anticipated behavioral response to coverage.
Slightly more direct evidence of selection on moral hazard comes from comparing the estimated
14behavioral response (estimated by examining the change in spending with the change from the
original to the new options) between those who chose more vs. less coverage under the original
options. The last panel of Table 7 presents the estimated treatment e⁄ect of the move from the
original to the new options separately for individuals who chose more coverage under the original
options in 2003 compared to those who chose less coverage under the original options in 2003.22
Consistent with selection on moral hazard, we estimate a reduction in spending associated with
the move from the old options to the new options that is more than twice as large for those who
originally had more coverage than those who originally had less coverage, even though the reduction
in cost sharing associated with the change in options (i.e., the treatment) is substantially larger
for those who had less coverage. We do not have enough precision, however, to reject the null that
estimated spending reductions are the same across the two groups. Moreover, we are once again
confronted with the need to model the endogenous plan choice from among the new option as well
as the variation in expected end of year marginal price induced by variation in health status.
Overall, we view the ￿ndings as suggestive descriptive evidence of selection on moral hazard
of the expected sign. The rest of the paper now investigates this phenomenon more formally
by developing and estimating a model of individual coverage choice and health care utilization.
The model allows us to formalize more precisely the notion of ￿moral hazard,￿ and aids in the
identi￿cation of heterogeneity in moral hazard and selection on it. It also allows us to quantify
selection on moral hazard and explore its implications through various counterfactual exercises.
4 A model of coverage choice and utilization
We now present a stylized model of individual coverage choice and health care utilization which
we will then use as the main ingredient in our econometric speci￿cation and counterfactual exer-
cises. The model is designed to allow us to isolate and examine separately three di⁄erent potential
determinants of insurance coverage choice: health expectations, risk aversion, and ￿moral hazard
type.￿
We consider a two period model. In the ￿rst period, a risk-averse expected-utility maximizing
individual makes an optimal health insurance coverage choice, using his available information to
form his expectation regarding his subsequent health realization. In the second period, the in-
dividual observes his realized health and makes an optimal health care utilization decision, which
depends on the realized health as well as on his coverage. It is this last e⁄ect which leads to what we
call moral hazard. This general modeling framework is similar to the one used in existing empirical
22Speci￿cally, we compare individuals who picked option 3 (￿more coverage￿ ) under the original options to those
who picked option 2 (￿less coverage￿ ) under the original options. To do this analysis we need to limit the sample
to the approximately 85 percent of the sample who was already employed at the ￿rm by 2003 and in one of these
two options. The estimated change in spending associated with the move from the old to the new options for this
subsample is -859 (standard error 245), compared to -592 (standard error 264) in the full 2003-2006 sample (Table 5,
column (4)).
15models of demand for health insurance and medical spending (Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Bajari et
al., 2010; Carlin and Town, 2010; Handel, 2010).
We begin with notation. This is a model of individual behavior, so we omit i subscripts to
simplify notation; in the next section, where we take the model to the data, we describe how
individuals may vary. At the time of his utilization choice (period 2), an individual is characterized
by two objects: his health realization ￿, and his ￿moral hazard type￿ !. The health realization
￿ captures the uncertain aspect of demand for healthcare, with individuals with higher ￿ being
sicker and demanding greater healthcare consumption. The moral hazard type ! determines how
responsive health care utilization decisions are to insurance coverage. In other words, ! a⁄ects the
individual￿ s price elasticity of demand for healthcare with respect to its (out of pocket) price, with
individuals with higher ! being more price elastic and therefore increasing their utilization more
sharply in response to greater insurance coverage.
At the time of coverage choice (period 1), an individual is characterized by three objects: F￿(￿),
!, and  . The ￿rst, F￿(￿), represents the individual￿ s expectation about his subsequent health
risk ￿. It is precisely the (natural) assumption that individuals do not know ￿ with certainty
at the time of coverage choice, which leads them to demand insurance. The second object that
enters the individual￿ s coverage choice is his moral hazard type !, which determines his period 2
price elasticity of demand for health care. Because individuals are forward looking, they anticipate
that their price sensitivity will subsequently a⁄ect their utilization choices, and this in turn a⁄ects
their utility from di⁄erent coverages. It is this channel that creates the potential for selection on
moral hazard, which is the main focus of our paper. Finally, the third object is  , which captures
the individual￿ s coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Importantly, unlike ! and F￿(￿), which enter
the coverage choice but also a⁄ect (deterministically and stochastically, respectively) utilization
decisions, risk preferences a⁄ect coverage choice but play no direct role in utilization decisions.
Utilization choice In the second period, insurance coverage, denoted by j, is taken as given.
We assume that the individual￿ s health care utilization decision is made in order to maximize a
tradeo⁄ between health and money, with higher ! individuals putting greater weight on health.
Speci￿cally, we assume that the individual￿ s second period utility is separable in health and money
and can be written as u(m;￿;!) = h(m ￿ ￿;!) + y(m), where m ￿ 0 is the monetized utilization
choice, ￿ is the monetized health realization, and y(m) is the residual income. Naturally, y(m) is
decreasing in m at a rate that depends on coverage. In contrast, we assume that h(m ￿ ￿;!) is
concave in its ￿rst argument, so that it is increasing for low levels of utilization (when treatment
presumably improves health) and is decreasing eventually (when there is no further health ben-
e￿t from treatment and time costs dominate). Thus, we assume that the marginal bene￿t from
incremental utilization is decreasing. Using this formulation, we think of ￿, the underlying health
realization, as shifting the level of optimal utilization m￿. Finally, we assume that h(m ￿ ￿;!) is
increasing in its second argument, but this is purely a normalization which (as we will see below)
allows us to interpret individuals with higher ! as those who are more elastic with respect to the
price of medical utilization.
16We parametrize further so that the second-period utility function is given by
u(m;￿;!;j) =
￿
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That is, we assume that h(m ￿ ￿;!) is quadratic in its ￿rst argument, with ! a⁄ecting its curva-
ture. We also explicitly write the residual income as the initial income y minus the premium pj
associated with coverage j and the out-of-pocket expenditure cj(m) associated with utilization m










so that u(m;￿;!;j) = e u(m;￿;!;j) + y ￿ pj.




It will also be convenient to denote u￿(￿;!;j) ￿ u(m￿(￿;!;j);￿;!;j) and e u￿(￿;!;j) ￿ e u(m￿(￿;!;j);￿;!;j).
To facilitate intuition, we consider here optimal utilization for the case of a linear (i.e., constant
coinsurance) coverage contract, so that cj(m) = c ￿ m where c 2 [0;1]. Full insurance is therefore
given by c = 0 and no insurance is given by c = 1. The ￿rst order condition implied by the
optimization problem in equation (3) is therefore given by 1 ￿ 1
!(m ￿ ￿) ￿ c = 0, or
m￿(￿;!;c) = max[0;￿ + !(1 ￿ c)]: (4)
Thus, abstracting from the potential truncation of utilization at zero, the individual will spend
m￿ = ￿ with no insurance (i.e., c = 1) and m￿ = ￿ + ! with full insurance (i.e., c = 0). Thus, the
utilization response to the change in coverage from full to no insurance is !; utilization responds
more to changes in coverage for individuals of greater moral hazard type (i.e., higher !). One way
to think about this model of moral hazard, therefore, is that ￿ represents non-discretionary health
care shocks that all individuals will pay to treat, regardless of insurance. There is also discretionary
health care utilization (such as whether to go to the doctor when confronted with a minor pain or
irritation, for example) which, without insurance will not be undertaken. With insurance, some
amount of this discretionary care will be consumed, with individuals with a higher ! consuming
more of this discretionary care when they are insured.23
23We have written the model as if it is the individual who makes all the utilization decisions. In practice, many of
the decisions are also a⁄ected by physicians. To the extent that physicians also respond to the individual￿ s coverage
(and they are likely to), our interpretation of moral hazard should be thought of as some combination of both the
individual￿ s and the physician￿ s responses.
17Coverage choice In the ￿rst period, the individual faces a fairly standard insurance coverage
choice. As mentioned, we assume that the individual is an expected-utility maximizer, with a
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion of  . We further assume that the individual￿ s von Neumann
Morgenstern (vNM) utility function is of the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form, w(x) =
￿exp(￿ x). In a typical insurance setting w(x) is de￿ned solely over ￿nancial outcomes. However,
because moral hazard is present, individuals trade o⁄ income and health and therefore w(x) is
de￿ned over the realized second-period utility u￿(￿;!;j). We note that income enters u￿(￿;!;j)
additively with a coe¢ cient of one, so u￿(￿;!;j) is monetized and can still be thought of in dollars,
as in the regular case.
Consider now a set of coverage options J, with each option j 2 J de￿ned by its premium pj
and coverage function cj(m). Following the above assumptions, the individual will then evaluate
his expected utility from each option,
vj(F￿(￿);!; ) = ￿
Z
exp(￿ u￿(￿;!;j))dF￿(￿); (5)
with his optimal coverage choice given by
j￿(F￿(￿);!; ) = argmax
j2J
vj(F￿(￿);!; ): (6)
Measuring welfare and e¢ cient contracts Our standard measure of consumer welfare in this
context will be the notion of certainty equivalent. That is, for an individual de￿ned by (F￿(￿);!; ),
we denote the certainty equivalent to a contract j by the scalar ej that solves ￿exp(￿ ej) =
vj(F￿(￿);!; ), or








Our assumption of CARA utility over (additively separable) income and health implies no income
e⁄ects. To see the implications of no income e⁄ects, we can substitute u￿(￿;!;j) = e u￿(￿;!;j)+y￿pj
into equation (7) and reorganize to obtain








+ y ￿ pj;
so that e ej(F￿(￿);!; ) captures the welfare from coverage, and residual income enters additively.
Using this notation, di⁄erences in e e(￿) across contracts with di⁄erent coverages capture the will-
ingness to pay for coverage. For example, an individual de￿ned by (F￿(￿);!; ) is willing to pay at
most e ek(F￿(￿);!; ) ￿ e ej(F￿(￿);!; ) in order to increase his coverage from j to k.
Equation (8) can also be used to characterize the comparative statics of willingness to pay
for more coverage with respect to the model￿ s primitives. In general, willingness to pay for more
coverage is increasing in risk aversion   and in risk F￿(￿) (in a ￿rst order stochastic dominance
18sense).24 Given our speci￿c parametrization, willingness to pay for more coverage is also increasing
in moral hazard type !.25
We assume that insurance providers are risk neutral, so that the provider￿ s welfare is given by
his expected pro￿ts, or
￿j(F￿(￿);!) ￿ pj ￿
Z
[m￿(￿;!;j) ￿ cj (m￿(￿;!;j))]dF￿(￿); (9)
where the integrand captures the share of the utilization covered by the provider under contract j.
Total surplus sj is then given by
sj(F￿(￿);!; ) = ej(F￿(￿);!; )+￿j(F￿(￿);!) = e ej(F￿(￿);!; )+y￿
Z
[m￿(￿;!;j) ￿ cj (m￿(￿;!;j))]dF￿(￿):
(10)
That is, total surplus is simply certainty equivalent minus expected cost.
Finally, it may be useful to characterize the nature of the e¢ cient contract in this setting.
Because of our CARA assumptions, premiums are a transfer which do not a⁄ect total surplus.
Therefore, the e¢ cient contract can be characterized by the e¢ cient coverage function c￿(￿) that
maximizes total surplus (as given by equation (10)) over the set of possible coverage functions. Such
optimal contracts would trade o⁄ two o⁄setting forces. On one hand, an individual is risk averse
while the provider is risk natural, so optimal risk sharing implies full coverage, under which the
individual is not exposed to risk. On the other hand, the presence of moral hazard makes an insured
individual￿ s privately optimal utilization choice socially ine¢ cient; any positive insurance coverage
makes the individual face a healthcare price which is lower than the social cost of healthcare,
leading to excessive utilization. E¢ cient contracts will therefore resolve this tradeo⁄ by some form
of partial coverage (Arrow, 1971; Holmstrom, 1979). For example, it is easy to see that no insurance
(c￿(m) = m) is e¢ cient if individuals are risk neutral or face no risk (F￿(￿) is degenerate), and that
full insurance (c￿(m) = 0) is e¢ cient when moral hazard is not present (! = 0• ). In all other
situations, the e¢ cient contract is some form of partial insurance.
Discussion Before turning to estimation, a few of our speci￿c modeling choices above merit some
further discussion.
24These comparative statics do not always hold. The model has unappealing properties when a signi￿cant portion
of the distribution of ￿ is over the negative range, in which case the individual is exposed to a somewhat arti￿cial
uninsurable (background) risk (since spending is truncated at zero). We are not particularly concerned about this
feature, however, as our estimated parameters do not give rise to it, and because we have experimented with a
(non-elegant) modi￿cation to the model that does not have this feature, and the overall results were similar.
25In a more general model, ! is associated with two e⁄ects. One is the increased utilization, which increases
willingness to pay. The second e⁄ect is the increased ￿ exibility to adjust utilization as a function of the realized
uncertainty (￿), which in turn reduces risk exposure and reduces willingness to pay for insurance. Our speci￿c
parameterization was designed to have spending under no insurance una⁄ected by !; this eliminates this latter e⁄ect,
and therefore makes the comparative statics unambiguous.
19Terminology. The key conceptual distinction we are interested in is the possibility that selection
is not only driven by ￿traditional￿selection, on the expected level of medical expenditures (F￿(￿)),
but also by selection on the basis of the incremental medical expenditure with respect to increased
coverage (!). We refer to this latter e⁄ect as ￿moral hazard.￿
The use of the term ￿moral hazard￿to refer to the responsiveness of medical care utilization
to insurance coverage dates back at least to Arrow (1963). Consistent with the notion of ￿hidden
action￿￿as is typically associated with the term ￿moral hazard" ￿it has been conjectured that
health insurance may induce individuals to exert less (unobserved) e⁄ort in maintaining their health.
However, in the context of health insurance the term ￿moral hazard￿is more typically used to refer
to the price elasticity of demand for health care, conditional on underlying health status (Pauly,
1968; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). We thus follow this abuse of terminology, and use the term
in a similar way. In other words, our model, like most in this literature, does not consider the
potential impact of insurance on underlying health ￿.
As a result, the asymmetric information problem that we associate with ￿moral hazard￿ is
arguably more accurately described as one of hidden information (rather than of hidden action).
The individual￿ s actions (utilization) are observed and contractible, but his underlying health ￿ is
hidden information which, if contractible, would be the e¢ cient object of reimbursement. For our
purposes, whether the problem is one of hidden information or hidden action is simply an issue of
appropriate usage of terminology, and here we simply follow convention.26
Additive e⁄ect of moral hazard. We made the strong choice to model moral hazard (!) as a level
shift in spending that is (except due to the truncation of spending at zero) independent of one￿ s
health (￿) (see, e.g., equation (4)). This is primarily for analytical tractability. Our choice of the
utility function in equation (1) is designed to achieve a straightforward economic interpretation of
the key parameters of interest in the ￿rst order condition (4). In particular, it is designed so that ￿
(health status) is the monetized health spending without insurance (i.e., one￿ s ￿nondiscretionary￿
spending), and ! (moral hazard) captures incremental, ￿discretionary￿ spending as individuals
are moved from no insurance to full insurance. This allows us to straightforwardly measure and
compare the magnitude of (and heterogeneity in) health risk ￿ and moral hazard !. In alternative
models that would give rise to a model of utilization that is non-separable in ￿ and !, the monetized
moral hazard e⁄ect would depend on both parameters; in this case it would be much more di¢ cult
to de￿ne (and analyze) the choices and behavior of high vs. low moral hazard types distinctly from
high vs. low health status types.
We should note that this analytical tractability does not come at the obvious expense of realism.
In other words, it is not a priori obvious whether or not moral hazard a⁄ects individuals in a manner
26There are two potential justi￿cations given in the literature for why the impact of insurance on medical expendi-
tures, conditional on health status, may constitute hidden action. First, patients and physicians may take less e⁄ort
to shop around for better prices when they are insured (Arrow, 1963). Second, if insurance a⁄ects the quantity of
care consumed, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) argue that this still constitutes hidden action since ￿though the action
itself (seeking medical care) is not hidden, the motivation behind it is.￿
20that is additively separable from their health. It does not strikes us as unreasonable to assume
that whether or not one chooses to seek care for some minor skin irritation may not be a⁄ected
by one￿ s overall severity of illness. Of course, it is also not unreasonable to imagine that the
responsiveness of medical care utilization to insurance coverage could depend on one￿ s underlying
health (￿) for a variety of reasons; for example, individuals who are sicker arguably have more
occasions to make medical decisions and therefore to ￿exercise￿moral hazard. Our ￿nding that
all of the spending reduction associated with the move to the new options seems to come from
reductions in doctor and outpatient utilization and not in (the much more expensive) inpatient
utilization (see Appendix A) suggests that the ￿right￿ model of moral hazard may not be one
where the e⁄ects are multiplicative in underlying health. Still, moral hazard e⁄ects may also not
be completely independent of health. Importantly, our set-up does not preclude this. Although we
do not explicitly model this complementarity ￿within￿an individual, our empirical speci￿cation
below will allow for this in the aggregate, by modeling a cross-sectional distribution that allows for
an arbitrary correlation between individual￿ s moral hazard type and health risk.
Source of moral hazard. We do not explicitly model the underlying ￿source￿of moral hazard
(!) and potential heterogeneity in it. The level of an individual￿ s ! presumably derives from some
combination of the individual￿ s value of time (income), his disutility of doctor visits, his underlying
health conditions (e.g., how discretionary they are), and so on. It may also relate to one￿ s risk
aversion regarding future health conditions. We have modeled the second period utility in a static
way, with no uncertainty. As a result, moral hazard is not directly determined by risk aversion.
Nonetheless, one can well imagine that more risk averse people might be less sensitive to price in
making their medical care consumption decisions, making them have a lower ! in the context of
our model. This is not inconsistent with our model. Our empirical speci￿cation below will allow for
an arbitrary correlation between moral hazard type (!) and risk aversion ( ). We will also allow
! to vary with various observable characteristics, that may provide guidance on its sources.
Welfare. Finally, we note that our model assumes that any moral-hazard induced expenditure
represents pure waste from a societal perspective. In other words, we assume that individuals would
consume the socially optimal amount of medical care if they were uninsured. We view this as a
natural benchmark rather than a normative statement about the healthcare industry. In practice,
in the absence of insurance medical expenditures may be too high or too low relative to e¢ cient
levels. For example, in the absence of subsidies, liquidity constrained and/or myopic consumers may
under-consume medical care that has no immediate payo⁄, particularly preventive care. Absent
any clear guidance as to the nature and magnitude of any such frictions, we abstract from them
in our model. In our particular setting, we also suspect that the induced reduction in medical
spending with the move to the new, less generous health insurance options is not likely to have
involved a socially sub-optimal reduction in consumption of some aspects of medical care since the
price of preventive care actually decreased with the move to the new options.27
27Busch et al. (2006) and Cabral (2010) estimate that the move to the new options had no e⁄ect on the use of
preventive care, perhaps because at the same time that the price of preventive care was lowered, the price of physician
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5.1 Parameterization
We now turn to specify a more complete econometric model that is based on the economic model
of individual coverage choice and utilization developed in the last section. This will allow us to
jointly estimate coverage choices and utilization, relate the estimated parameters of the model to
underlying economic objects of interest, and quantify how spending and welfare may be a⁄ected
under various counterfactuals. The additional modeling assumptions in this section are of two
di⁄erent natures. First, we will need to specify more parametrically some of the objects introduced
earlier (e.g., individuals￿beliefs F￿(￿)). Second, we need to specify what form of heterogeneity we
allow across individuals, and for a given individual over time.
Our unit of observation is an employee i, in a given year t. We abstract from the speci￿cs of
the timing and nature of claims, and, as we have done so far, simply code utilization mit as the
total medical spending (in dollars) for the entire year. The individual faces the choice set of either
the original plan options or the new plan options (as described in Table 2), depending on the year
and the employee￿ s union a¢ liation, which dictates whether and when he was switched to the new
bene￿ts options.
Using the model of Section 4, recall that individuals are de￿ned by three objects: their beliefs
about their subsequent health status F￿(￿), their moral hazard parameter !, and their risk aversion
 . We assume that !i and  i may vary across employees, but are constant for a given employee
over time. It is the potential heterogeneity in !i which is the focus of the paper. We also assume
that F￿(￿) is a (shifted) lognormal distribution with parameters ￿￿;it, ￿￿;i, with support (￿￿;i;1),
as explained below. That is, beliefs about health also vary across employees, and we allow ￿￿;it to
be time varying to re￿ ect the possibility that information about one￿ s health evolves with time.
At the time of coverage choice individuals believe that
log(￿it ￿ ￿￿;i) ￿ N(￿￿;it;￿2
￿;i); (11)
and these beliefs are correct. Assuming a lognormal distribution for ￿ is natural, as the distribution
of annual health expenditures is highly skewed (see Figure 1). The additional parameter ￿￿;i is
used in order to capture the signi￿cant fraction of individuals who have no spending over an entire
year. When ￿￿;i is negative, the support of the implied distribution of ￿it is expanded, allowing for
￿it to obtain negative values, which in turn implies (when !i is not too large) zero spending. The
parameter ￿￿;i indicates the precision of the individual￿ s information about his subsequent health:
It is the heterogeneity in ￿￿;it, ￿￿;i, and ￿￿;i that gives rise to the traditional form of adverse











visits (which are likely complements to the use of preventive care) was raised. As mentioned, preventive care is about
2 percent of overall spending in our sample.
22That is, higher ￿￿;it, ￿￿;i, or ￿￿;i are all associated with higher expected ￿, which all else equal
leads to greater expected medical spending and greater cost by the insurance provider.28 All else
equal, individuals with higher ￿￿;it, ￿￿;i, or ￿￿;i also prefer to choose greater coverage, thus giving
rise to adverse selection.
Let xit denote a vector of observables which are taken as given, and let xi denote their within-
individual average. In order to link the latent variables to observables, we make several parametric
assumptions. First, we assume that log!i, log i, and ￿￿;i (which denotes the average (over time)
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We then assume a random e⁄ects structure on ￿it, so that ￿it varies over time, but is correlated
within an employee, such that
￿￿;it = ￿￿;i + (xit ￿ xi)￿￿ + ￿￿;it; (14)
where ￿￿;it is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term, with variance ￿2
￿. The variance of ￿￿;it is
then ￿2
￿ = ￿2
￿ ￿ + ￿2
￿. Finally, we assume that
￿￿2
￿;i ￿ ￿(￿1;￿2)1f￿2









￿;i is drawn from a right truncated inverse gamma distribution,30 and ￿￿;i is drawn from
a normal distribution, and both are drawn independently from the other latent variables.
Thus, overall we estimate four vectors of mean shifters (￿￿, ￿!, ￿ , ￿￿), eight variance and
covariance parameters (￿￿, ￿";￿!,￿ ,￿￿,￿￿;!,￿￿; ,￿!; ), and two additional parameters (￿1;￿2)
that determine the distribution of ￿￿2
￿;i. Of course, an important decision is what observables xi
shift which primitive, and whether we would like any observables to be excluded from one or more of
the (four) equations. To pay particular attention to the underlying variation emphasized in Section
2, in all the speci￿cations we experiment with, we include in xi treatment group ￿xed e⁄ects for
each of the four treatment groups (see Table 1), as well as a year ￿xed e⁄ect on ￿￿;it, the only time
varying latent variable. We also include coverage tier ￿xed e⁄ects since both the choice sets and
28Note that expected medical spending of an individual is closely related but not identical to ￿, since both moral
hazard and the restriction that spending be non negative create a wedge between expected medical spending and
expected health (see, e.g., equation (4)).
29For notational simplicity we consider xi to be the super-set of covariates, and implicitly assume some coe¢ cient
restrictions if we allow for di⁄erent mean shifters for di⁄erent latent variables.
30We truncate the distribution of ￿
￿2
￿;i because the non-truncated distribution causes the unconditional distribution
of ￿it to have no moments.
23spending varies substantially by coverage tier (see Table 2 and Figure 1, respectively), and a rich
set of demographics, speci￿cally age, gender, job tenure, income, and health risk scores.
5.2 Estimation
We estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Gibbs sampling. The multi-
dimensional unobserved heterogeneity naturally lends itself to such methods, as the iterative sam-
pling allows us to avoid evaluating multi-dimensional integrals numerically, which is computation-
ally cumbersome. The key observation is that the model we developed is su¢ ciently ￿ exible so
that we can augment the latent variables into the model and formulate a hierarchical statistical
model. To see this, let ￿1 =
￿
￿￿;￿!;￿ ;￿￿;￿￿;￿";￿!;￿ ;￿￿;￿￿;!;￿￿; ;￿!; ;￿1;￿2
￿
be the set




i=1;t=2003 be the set of
employee-year latent variables. The model is set up so that, even conditional on ￿1, we can al-
ways rationalize the observed data ￿namely, plan choice and medical utilization ￿by appropriately
￿nding a set of latent variables for each individual, ￿2.
Thus, the iterative procedure is straightforward. We can ￿rst sample from the distribution of ￿1
conditional on ￿2. Because, conditional on ￿2, there is no additional information in the data about
￿1 this part of the sampling is simple and quite standard. Then, we can sample from the distribution
of ￿2 conditional on ￿1 and the information available in the data. This latter step is of course more
customized toward our speci￿c model, but does not introduce any conceptual di¢ culties. The full
sampling procedure, the speci￿c prior distributions we impose, and the resultant posteriors are
described in detail in Appendix B. We veri￿ed using Monte Carlo simulations that the procedure
seems to work quite e⁄ectively, and is pretty robust to initial values. For our baseline results, the
estimation seems to converge after about 5,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, so we drop the ￿rst
10,000 draws and use the last 10,000 draws of each variable to report our results. The results we
report are based on the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation from these 10,000 draws.
One important di¢ culty that our model introduces is related to our decision to not allow for an
additive separable plan-speci￿c error term. It is extremely common in applications of discrete choice
(such as ours) to add such error terms, and often to assume that they are distributed i.i.d. across
plans and individuals. Such error terms serve two important roles. First, they allow the researcher
to rationalize any choice observed in the data through a large enough error term. Second, their
independence makes the objective function of any M-estimator smooth, which is computationally
attractive for numerical optimization. In the context of our application, however, we view such
error terms as economically unappealing. The options from which individuals in our sample choose
are ￿nancially rankable and are identical in their non-￿nancial features. This makes one wonder
what such error terms would capture that is outside of our model. The clear ranking of the options
also makes the i.i.d. nature of the error terms not very appealing. Instead, we introduce a fair
amount of heterogeneity along the other dimensions of our model. Some of this heterogeneity (e.g.,
the heterogeneity in ￿￿;i and ￿￿;i) is richer than the minimum required to capture the key economic
forces we would like to capture, but this richness is what allows us to rationalize all observed choices
24in the data. This still leads to a model which is not very attractive for numerical optimization,
which is one important reason why we use Gibbs sampling.31
5.3 Identi￿cation
We now discuss the identi￿cation of the model. Conditional on the individual-behavior model
described in Section 4, the object of interest that we seek to identify is the joint distribution of F￿(￿),
!, and  . We have data on individuals￿health insurance options, choices, and medical spending.
Throughout the paper we make the strong assumption that individual beliefs about their subsequent
health status (F￿(￿)) are correct.32 The model and its identi￿cation share many properties with
some of our earlier work on insurance (Cohen and Einav, 2007; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf,
2010). The key novel element is that we now allow for moral hazard, and heterogeneity in it. The
panel structure of the data and the staggered timing of the introduction of the new options are
key in allowing us to identify this new element. We organize our discussion of identi￿cation in two
steps. We ￿rst consider nonparametric identi￿cation of our model with ideal data, and then discuss
the ways in which our actual data is di⁄erent from the ideal, thus requiring us to make additional
parametric assumptions that aid in identi￿cation.
Identi￿cation with ideal data The two features of our data set that are instrumental for iden-
ti￿cation are the panel structure of the data and the exogenous change in the health insurance
options available to employees. In the ideal setting, we consider a case in which we observe individ-
uals for a su¢ ciently long period before and a su¢ ciently long period after the change in coverage.
Moreover, we assume that the choice set from which employees can choose coverage is continuous
(for example, one can imagine a continuous coinsurance rate, and an increasing and di⁄erentiable
mapping from coinsurance rate to premium).
In such a setting, our model is non-parametrically identi￿ed. To see this, note that such
data provide us with two medical expenditure distributions, G
before
i (m) and G
after
i (m), for each
individual i. Using the realized utility model (during the second period of the model), these two
distributions allow us to recover for each individual Fi;￿(￿) and !i. To see this, recall that abstracting
from the truncation of medical spending at zero, our model implies that medical expenditure mit
is equal to ￿it + !i(1 ￿ ct). If Fi;￿(￿) is stable over time,33 one can regress (for each employee i
31In addition to our previous work (Cohen and Einav, 2007; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf, 2010), several other
papers have estimated a discrete choice model without an i.i.d. error, for similar reasons. These include Keane and
Mo¢ tt (1998), Berry and Pakes (2007), and Goettler and Clay (forthcoming).
32While it is reasonable to question this assumption, absent direct data on beliefs some assumption about beliefs is
essential for identi￿cation. Otherwise, it is not possible to distinguish beliefs from other preferences that only a⁄ect
choices, such as risk aversion (see Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010) for a more detailed discussion of this point).
While we could instead assume some other (pre-speci￿ed) form of biased beliefs, correct beliefs seem like a natural
starting point.
33If Fi;￿(￿) changes over time, one could parameterize, identify, and estimate the autocorrelation structure with a
25separately) mit on a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the change. The estimated coe¢ cient
on the dummy variable would be then an estimate of !i (cafter ￿ cbefore), providing an estimate of
!i. The distribution of ￿it can then be recovered by observing that ￿it = mit ￿ !i(1 ￿ ct), which
is known.
Conditional on Fi;￿(￿) and !i, individual i￿ s choice from a continuous set of options provides a
unique mapping from choices to his coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion since ￿conditional on Fi;￿(￿)
and !i ￿the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is the only unknown primitive that may shift employees￿
choices, and it does so monotonically. Thus, using information about Fi;￿(￿) and !i and individual
i￿ s choice from the continuous option set,34 we can recover  i. Since we recovered Fi;￿(￿), !i, and
 i for each employee, we can now combine these estimates for our entire sample, and obtain the
joint distributions of F￿(￿), !, and  .
Identi￿cation with our speci￿c data Our actual data depart from the ideal data described
above in two main ways. First, although we have a panel structure, we only observe individuals
for two periods in the baseline sample (that is limited to 2003 and 2004). Second, the choice set is
highly discrete (including three to ￿ve options) rather than continuous. We thus make additional
parametric assumptions to aid us in identi￿cation. This implies that our identi￿cation in the
actual estimation cannot rely anymore on identifying the individual-speci￿c parameters employee-
by-employee. Rather, we observe a distribution of medical expenditures before the change and a
distribution for medical expenditure after the change. We then identify the model by comparing
the distribution after with the distribution before.
We can now think ￿rst about the identi￿cation of moral hazard. A comparison of spending
distributions before and after a change in health insurance options may be contaminated by other
confounders that change over time. Therefore, analogously to the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences strategy
of the reduced form (Section 3), we use the majority of the sample for which the options did
not change during our sample period as a control group. We can therefore conceptually think of
identi￿cation in our baseline sample as if we follow a stable population before and after a treatment,
using the control population to adjust for any time-varying e⁄ects.
To gain intuition for our identi￿cation of moral hazard, consider a set of individuals who chose
the same sequence of plans in 2003 and 2004. Of course, this is a selected subset of the population, a
point that we will return to below. Without moral hazard, the distribution of medical expenditures
for this group, before and after the change, would have remained the same. With moral hazard,
spending under the new, say, lower coverage plan is lower. Loosely, and abstracting from truncation
of spending at zero, the overall di⁄erence in the level of spending identi￿es the average moral hazard
e⁄ect. Since our model implies that the moral hazard parameter a⁄ects spending additively, the
su¢ ciently long panel (the health risk score variable, which varies over time for a given individual, is quite useful in
this regard). We therefore treat Fi;￿(￿) as stable over time throughout this section.
34This can be done using either the options set before the change or after. In fact, the ideal data leads to over
identi￿cation, so could allow us to test or enrich the model.
26extent of heterogeneity in moral hazard is identi￿ed by the di⁄erence in the distributions, quantile-
by-quantile.
Once the distribution of moral hazard, !i, is known, the remaining identi￿cation challenge is
very similar to our earlier work (Cohen and Einav, 2007; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf, 2010).
Conditional on the distribution of !i, our data provide information about coverage choices and
subsequent realizations. By assuming that Fi;￿(￿) follows a lognormal distribution, we can map
the data on choices and spending to the remaining primitives of risk aversion  i and risk types
Fi;￿(￿). Intuition for this is perhaps most easily seen in two steps (although in practice it is more
e¢ cient to estimate all parameters simultaneously, as we do). The observed distribution of medical
spending (net of the known moral hazard) provides information on the distribution of health risk
Fi;￿(￿); conditional on health risk and moral hazard, the choice of insurance identi￿es risk aversion
( i). We assume a three-dimensional heterogeneity in Fi;￿(￿) ￿in mean ￿, variance ￿, and o⁄set
￿. Loosely, the distribution of the mean is primarily identi￿ed by the ￿rst moment of the spending
distribution, the distribution of the variance by the second moment, and the distribution of ￿ is
primarily driven by the extent of zero spending across di⁄erent choices.
Two di¢ culties still remain. First, the choice set is discrete, so choices can only map to intervals
of risk aversion. Second, while the distribution of !i across individuals is known, the speci￿c value
of !i is not known for each individual. Here, the parametric assumption regarding the joint normal
distribution of log!i, ￿￿;i, and log i is useful, as it allows us to integrate over all possible values
within each such choice interval. The ￿nal step is to repeat a similar argument for each observed
sequence of choices, which together aggregate to the joint distribution of the population as a whole,
which is the object we wish to identify.
6 Results
6.1 Parameter estimates
Table 8(a) presents the estimated parameters from estimating the model on the baseline sample
of 7,570 employee-years. The top panel presents the estimated coe¢ cients on the mean shifters of
the four latent variables: ￿￿;it and ￿￿;i which a⁄ect expected health risk (E(￿it)), !i which a⁄ects
moral hazard, and  i which captures risk aversion. The middle panel report the estimated variance-
covariance matrix and the bottom panel reports the estimates of the rest of the parameters. In
Table 8(b) we report some implied quantities of interest that are derived from the estimates. The
latter may be more easy to interpret, so we focus much of the discussion on them.
Overall, as shown in the top panel of Table 8(b), the estimates imply an average health risk
(E(￿)) of about $4,340 per employee-year. We estimate an average moral hazard parameter (!)
that is about 30 percent of the average health risk, or about $1,330 dollar; by way of context, recall
that ! is approximately the size of the spending e⁄ect as we move individuals from no insurance
27to full insurance (see equation (4)).35
We estimate statistically signi￿cant and economically large heterogeneity in each one of the
components: health, moral hazard, and risk aversion. One way to gauge the magnitude of this
heterogeneity is in the top panel of Table 8(b). Our estimates indicate a standard deviation for
expected health risk (E(￿)) of about $5,100, or a coe¢ cient of variation of about 1.2; the standard
deviation of realized health (￿) is, not surprisingly, much larger at $25,000 (not shown). Moral
hazard (!) is also estimated to be highly heterogenous, with a standard deviation across employees
of about $3,200, or a coe¢ cient of variation that is greater than 2. Finally, we estimate a coe¢ cient
of variation for absolute risk aversion ( ) that is about one.
The unconditional correlations (Table 8(b), middle panel) are all statistically signi￿cant, and
their signs seem reasonable. We estimate that the unconditional correlation between moral hazard
(!) and expected health risk (E(￿)) is positive and reasonably important (0.24).This likely re￿ ects
the fact that in our model moral hazard type (!) is measured in absolute (dollar) terms rather than
relative to health, so individuals with higher E(￿) (i.e., worse health) have more opportunities to
exercise moral hazard. The correlation between risk aversion and health risk (and moral hazard) is
negative, perhaps re￿ ecting the fact that individuals who are more risk averse are also those who
take better care of their health. A similar pattern was documented by Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006) in the context of long-term care insurance. Finally, as may be expected, we estimate a strong
correlation in ￿￿;it over time, of 0.5 (not shown), suggesting that much of an individual￿ s health
risk is persistent over time, for example due to chronic conditions.
The signs of the covariates seem generally sensible.36 The bottom panel of Table 8(b) summa-
rizes the e⁄ects of covariates on E(￿) by combining their separate e⁄ects on ￿￿ and ￿￿. As could
be expected, the health risk scores are an important predictor of expected health risk E(￿), shifting
it by thousands of dollars in the expected direction. We also estimate that female employees and
employees with non-single coverage are associated with worse expected health (higher E(￿)). One
should interpret these latter e⁄ects cautiously, however, as health risk scores are partialled out and
are highly correlated with these other variables. This may also explain why the residual e⁄ect of
income and tenure on expected health appears negligible.
Our estimates also imply (top panel of Table 8(a)) that employees with higher (i.e., worse)
health risk scores are associated with greater moral hazard and lower risk aversion. Again, this
likely re￿ ects our choice to model moral hazard in absolute terms rather than relative to health.
Conditional on health risk scores, employees with single coverage appear to be associated with
35We estimate an average coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion of about 0.0019, but caution against trying to compare
this to existing estimates. In our model, realized utility is a function of both health risk and ￿nancial risk, while in
other papers that estimate risk aversion from insurance choices (e.g., Cohen and Einav, 2007; Handel, 2010) realized
utility is only over ￿nancial risk. Thus, the estimated ￿level￿ of risk aversion is not directly comparable; indeed,
one could add a separable health related component to utility that is a⁄ected only by ￿ to change the risk aversion
estimates, without altering anything else in the model.
36The covariates appear to explain about 55 to 60 percent of the variation in each of E(￿), !, and  :
28greater moral hazard as well as with greater risk aversion. This may represent di⁄erent process of
decision making regarding health coverage and health care utilization when regarding one self vs.
his family members.
6.2 Model ￿t
In Table 9 we report the actual and predicted plan choice probabilities. We ￿t the choices of
employees who are choosing from the original plan options remarkably well. The ￿t of the choices
from the new options is also reasonable, but not as good as the ￿t for the original options. This is
likely because there are many fewer employees in the baseline sample who are subject to the new
options. Thus, to the extent that the same model attempts to rationalize the choices from both
the old and new options, it is natural that more weight is given to trying to ￿t choices from the old
menu, leading to slightly worse ￿t for those choosing from the new menu.
Figure 2 reports the actual and predicted distributions of medical expenditure. The top panel
reports the ￿t for the individuals facing the old options, and the bottom panel reports the ￿t for the
individuals facing the new options. Overall, the ￿t is quite reasonable. For example, the predicted
average spending is within 10 percent of actual average spending under both the original and new
options, and the medians also ￿t quite well. We tend to over predict the fraction of individuals
who have no spending under the new options, but this again is likely driven by the relatively small
number of employees who are switched to the new options in our estimation sample.37
Finally, we note that if we simulate data based on our parameter estimates and then run the
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences analysis we report on in Section 3, we predict about an 8 percent reduction
in spending associated with moving from the old option set to the new option set. This is broadly
similar to the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates we obtained for the actual data (Table 6, columns
(1)-(3)). However, given how imprecise our di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates are, both in the actual
data and in the simulated data, we caution against making too much of any comparison. The lack
of statistical signi￿cance of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimate in the simulated data, relative to
the reasonably precise estimates of the model parameters, suggests that a more complete model of
unobservable heterogeneity and endogenous plan choice is important in increasing precision.
6.3 Moral hazard estimates
The parameter !i captures moral hazard in our model . Recall that, abstracting from the truncation
of spending at zero, employee i would spend ￿it in year t if he had no insurance, and with full
insurance would spend ￿it+ !i: Thus, !i can be thought of as the scope for moral hazard. As
discussed, the top panel of Table 8(b) reports that the estimated average of !i is about 1,330
dollars, or about 30% of the estimated health risk (the average of ￿it).
37To conserve on space, Figure 2 pools individuals across coverage tiers, but the ￿t within singles or non-singles
looks similar to the results pooled by coverage tier, and the predicted di⁄erences in spending between singles and
non-singles are similar to the observed ones.
29Table 10 reports an alternative way one could quantify moral hazard. In the top row of the
table, we calculate each employee￿ s expected decline in medical expenditure as we move him from
the highest to the lowest coverage in the new options. We will feature the move (or choice) between
these two options in all of our subsequent counterfactual exercises. Recall that, as we have modeled
these options, moving from the highest to the lowest coverage primarily entails moving someone
from a plan with no deductible to a plan with a high deductible, speci￿cally a $3,000 deductible for
non-single coverage, or $1,500 for single coverage (Table 2). We estimate that the average spending
e⁄ect from this move is $348. The second row reports a similar exercise, but considers moving
individuals from full insurance to no insurance. We estimate an average spending reduction of
$1,273; this is slightly lower than the average !i of $1,330 reported earlier (see Table 8(b)) precisely
because of the truncation of spending at zero.
These economically meaningful estimates of moral hazard satisfy one necessary condition for
selection on moral hazard ￿the focus of our paper ￿to be important. A second necessary condition
is that moral hazard be heterogeneous. Indeed, we ￿nd important heterogeneity in our moral
hazard estimates across individuals. For example, the estimated variance of log(!) is about one,
and highly statistically signi￿cant (Table 8(a)), implying that an employee who is one standard
deviation above the mean is associated with a moral hazard parameter that is almost three times
greater than the mean, and an employee who is one standard deviation below the mean has a moral
hazard parameter that is less than a half of the mean. As shown in the top of Table 8(b), across
individuals, the standard deviation of !i is almost $3,200, and the coe¢ cient of variation of ! is
more than 2.
Again, Table 10 reports more empirically-motivated measures of heterogeneity in moral hazard.
The top row shows that the spending decline as we move individuals from the no deductible plan
to the high deductible plan has a standard deviation of $749, compared to the mean of $348. The
median spending reduction is only $48, while the 90th percentile exhibits a spending reduction of
more than a thousand dollars. Similarly, as we move individuals from full insurance to no insurance,
we estimate that the median reduction in spending is $310, but the 90th percentile of the spending
reduction distribution is greater than $3,000.
We brie￿ y explored the extent of heterogeneity in moral hazard implied by our results by the
same observable characteristics we explored in the descriptive evidence in Table 7. We found
generally similar results. For example, we estimate the average ! to be larger for older vs. younger
individuals ($1,590 vs. $1,080, respectively). We also estimate a larger average ! for those who
chose more vs. less coverage in 2003, which is consistent with selection on moral hazard. We now
turn to a more systematic examination of selection on moral hazard.
6.4 Selection on moral hazard
The fact that individuals are heterogeneous in their moral hazard response to coverage does not of
course mean that they select on it in any quantitatively meaningful way. That is, it is conceivable
that heterogeneity in other factors is more important in determining plan choice. As one way to
30gauge the quantitative importance of selection on moral hazard, we examine how the choice of
coverage varies with the quantiles of the marginal distribution of moral hazard !, and compare this
to how the choice of coverage varies with the quantiles of the marginal distribution of risk aversion
 , and of expected health risk E(￿). Once again, we focus on the choice between the highest
coverage and lowest coverage plan in the new options (see Table 2). Loosely, our exercise resembles
the introduction of a high deductible health insurance plan into a setting where previously there
was only a no deductible plan. We set the premiums so that, on average, 10 percent of our sample
chooses the high deductible plan.
Figure 3 reports the results. It shows the fraction of individuals choosing the high deductible
coverage, conditional on the individual being in each quantile of the marginal distribution of moral
hazard !, of risk aversion  , and of expected health risk E(￿): We present two di⁄erent sets
of results. The top panel presents the pattern while taking as given the underlying correlation
structure among these objects. This panel can be thought of as giving the empirical answer to the
question of how much selection there is, on net, on each of the latent primitives that we model.
Given the ￿ exible correlations we allow for, these patterns are a-priori of ambiguous sign. The
bottom panel repeats the same exercise but ￿shuts down￿the e⁄ect of the correlation structure. To
do so, we compute the marginal distributions (unconditional on observables) of each of the three
latent variables that a⁄ect plan choice (!,  , and E(￿)), and draw values for the other two latent
variables independently of the value of the variable for which the graph is drawn. This panel can be
thought of as giving the answer to the conceptual comparative static exercise of how much selection
there is on one latent factor, holding the other factors constant. As discussed previously, demand
for higher coverage generally increases in expected health risk, in risk aversion, and in moral hazard.
Our purpose here is to assess the relative magnitudes. Taken together, the two panels help inform
not only whether empirically there is selection on moral hazard and of what sign (top panel) but
also the extent to which any such selection is primarily ￿direct￿selection based on moral hazard
rather than ￿indirect￿selection arising from the correlation structure between moral hazard and
other factors which may be driving plan choice.
The results in the top panel indicate that empirically there is selection on moral hazard of the
expected sign, with higher moral hazard types (higher !) less likely to choose the high deductible
plan. In terms of the substantive importance of this selection, both panels reveal a similar qualita-
tive pattern: selection on moral hazard is substantially larger than selection on risk aversion and
of similar magnitude to selection on health risk. For example, the top panel indicates that moving
from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of the moral hazard distribution is associated with
about a 23 percentage point decline in the demand for the high deductible plan, while moving from
the 10th to the 90th percentile of the expected health risk distribution is associated with about
a 24 percentage point decline in the demand for the high deductible plan. While some of this
re￿ ects the underlying correlation structure, the ￿pure￿comparative static shown in the bottom
panel produces quite comparable magnitudes. This suggests that much of this selection on moral
hazard is ￿direct￿selection. In other words, in making plan choices, individuals select not only
based on their expected level of spending that they would incur with no insurance, but also on
31their expected slope, or incremental spending due to insurance.
By contrast, we ￿nd selection on risk aversion considerably less important than selection on
either moral hazard or expected health. In our data (see Figure 3(a)) there is very little variation
in demand for the high deductible plan across the centiles of the risk aversion distribution (re￿ ecting
various correlations), and even the ￿pure￿comparative static (Figure 3(b)) suggests only about a
15 percentage point range between the 10th and 90th percentile.
6.5 Implications for spending
We investigate the implications of the selection on moral hazard that we detect for attempts to
combat moral hazard through higher consumer cost sharing. To this end, we perform counterfactual
analyses of the spending reduction associated with introducing a lower coverage option. Given our
￿nding that higher ￿moral hazard types￿prefer greater coverage, accounting for this selection on
moral hazard suggests that introducing plans with greater consumer cost sharing will produce less
of a spending reduction than would be estimated if selection on moral hazard were ignored, and
it were assumed that those who select the lower coverage option are drawn at random from the
￿moral hazard type￿distribution.
In the health care sector, the impact of consumer cost sharing on moral hazard is an issue of
considerable policy as well as academic interest. The size and rapid growth of the health care
sector, and the pressure this places on public sector budgets, has created great interest among both
academics and policymakers in possible approaches to reducing health care spending. Encouraging
individuals to enroll in plans with higher consumer cost sharing, such as the tax-advantaged Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) designed to increase enrollment in high deductible plans, is seen as one
potentially promising approach to reducing health spending.
To examine the implications of selection on moral hazard for analysis of such e⁄orts, Figure 4
engages in the same exercise as in Figure 3 of giving employees in our sample a choice between the
no deductible and high deductible health insurance plans in the new options. In Figure 3 we ￿xed
the price of each option and reported the fraction of each quantile of a latent variable who choose
each plan. In Figure 4 we instead gradually increase the (relative) price of the higher coverage
(no deductible) option, and ask how selected is the group of employees who endogenously select
the lower coverage (high deductible) option at each given price. To show the extent of selection,
the ￿gure reports the average per employee decline in annual spending for those employees who
endogenously select the high deductible plan at each price.
The ￿gure illustrates strong selection on moral hazard, especially when the share of the high
deductible plan is small. For example, when the price of the no deductible coverage is low enough so
that only 10 percent of the employees select the high deductible coverage, the average (per employee)
spending decline for those who select the high deductible plan instead of the no deductible plan
is just over $130. By contrast, were all employees to choose the high deductible plan instead of
the no deductible plan, we estimate the per employee spending decline would be about $350. As
noted in the introduction, the common practice in the literature on health insurance and moral
32hazard is to look for experimental variation that randomly moves individuals across plans. Such
variation would recover the unconditional average e⁄ect of coverage (which is $348 in our context);
this does not account for selection on moral hazard and will therefore substantially over-estimate
the spending reduction associated with the introduction of the high deductible plan when only a
small share of individuals select it.
This selection re￿ ects the earlier observation that, all else equal, individuals that are associated
with higher moral hazard (higher !i) have higher willingness to pay for insurance, and are therefore
the ones that would be the last to switch to the lowest coverage, as we gradually increase the price
of highest coverage. It is somewhat interesting that in our setting the selection on moral hazard
becomes less important (i.e., the slope of the line in Figure 4 becomes less steep) at higher levels
of prices for the no deductible plans (which leads to greater fractions choosing the high deductible
plan). The same underlying forces are still in play, but are o⁄set by the correlation structure with
other primitives.
6.6 Implications for welfare
Our ￿ndings of selection on moral hazard also have implications for policies aimed at reducing selec-
tion. Analysis of how to mitigate selection often focuses on risk adjustment ￿whereby individual￿ s
insurance premiums are adjusted on the basis of individual covariates (such as age, gender, and
prior health conditions) that are predictive of expected medical spending. From this perspective,
the potential for selection on moral hazard suggests that investments in better monitoring technolo-
gies ￿such as coinsurance that varies across diagnoses (e.g., heart attack vs. headache) or types of
healthcare (e.g., prescription drugs vs. inpatient services) with di⁄erent behavioral responsiveness
to insurance ￿may also be e⁄ective at ameliorating adverse selection.
Our ￿nal set of counterfactual analyses considers these issues of contract design by using our
model to go further out of sample to analyze the impact of alternative contract designs on social
welfare. Table 11 reports our results. Once again we restrict our attention to a choice between the
no deductible and high deductible plans under the new options (Table 2, options 5 and 1 respec-
tively). Throughout this section we make the simplifying assumption of perfect competition for the
incremental coverage among providers of the no deducible plan, so that the incremental price of the
no deductible plan breaks even for those who provide it: incremental price is equal to incremental
cost.38 We report the implications of various counterfactual contracts for the equilibrium (incre-
mental) premium for the no deductible plan, the share choosing this plan, expected spending per
employee, and total welfare (or surplus) per employee. Our primary focus is on the consequence of
di⁄erent contract designs for total welfare (i.e., the sum of consumer welfare and producer welfare)
which in our context is the certainty equivalent minus expected costs (see equation (10)).
The ￿rst row presents the ￿status quo￿benchmark contract with no (additional) screening or
monitoring. As with the observed contracts in our data, individuals are o⁄ered a ￿uniform￿price
38We normalize the price of the lower coverage option to zero. Given our assumptions of CARA utility and a
realized utility that is additively separable in income, the price level does not a⁄ect plan choice or welfare.
33that only varies by coverage tier, and insurance companies reimburse medical spending, regardless
of its origin, based on their contract rules. We estimate that the competitive, average incremental
price for the no deductible plan (relative to the high deductible plan) is about $1,570, and that
at this competitive price 90% of the employees would select the no deductible plan. We normalize
total welfare per employee in this ￿status quo￿benchmark to be zero, so that we can more easily
compare the welfare gains from alternative contract designs.
The second row presents our ￿perfect screening￿counterfactual, which eliminates adverse selec-
tion. Speci￿cally, we assume that insurers can observe and price on all the determinants of health
care utilization that the individual knows at the time of his insurance choice ￿i.e., all of the com-
ponents of F(￿) as well as !. We solve for the incremental price of the no deductible plan that
breaks even for each employee individually, thereby eliminating the adverse selection that arises
from uniform pricing. The results indicate that, as expected, the elimination of adverse selection
leads to a lower (average) incremental premium for the no deductible plan, increased coverage (i.e.,
greater fraction choosing the no deductible plan), and higher welfare. It also leads to lower expected
spending since the risk-based pricing disproportionately shifts higher moral hazard (!) individuals
into lower coverage. We estimate the welfare gain per employee from eliminating adverse selection
to be about $52.39
Of particular interest is the contribution of eliminating selection on moral hazard to the welfare
gain from eliminating selection. Row 3 explores this by reporting the welfare gain from eliminating
only selection on moral hazard (!) but continuing to allow selection on health risk (F(￿)). Specif-
ically, we allow insurers to observe ! and price on it, but not on F(￿): This is of course not a very
sensible scenario, since presumably if insurers could observe ! they could also refuse to reimburse
on it, and thus eliminate moral hazard entirely (not just selection on moral hazard). But it is a
conceptually useful way to examine the welfare cost of di⁄erent sources of selection. The results in
row 3 suggest that the welfare cost of selection on moral hazard is $34, or about 65 percent of the
$52 total welfare cost of selection from row 2.
In an analogous fashion, we can investigate the contribution of eliminating selection on moral
hazard to the total welfare gain from eliminating moral hazard. In our setting, the welfare gain from
eliminating moral hazard stems from two sources: removing the allocative ine¢ ciency that arises
from selection on moral hazard and eliminating the ￿traditional￿moral hazard distortion that comes
through socially ine¢ cient over-utilization of health care. We show the results from eliminating
moral hazard in the fourth row, which presents our ￿perfect monitoring￿counterfactual. Here we
assume that insurance coverage only applies to ￿￿-related￿spending, which in the context of our
model means that instead of reimbursing based on actual spending (i.e., reimbursing m￿cj(m)), the
39By way of perspective, we calculate the total surplus from perfect screening relative to everyone being in the high
deductible plan to be $1,084, so that mispricing due to adverse selection appears to reduce welfare by only a small
amount relative to the total surplus at stake. Although not the focus of our paper, this ￿nding is consistent with
other recent empirical papers on the welfare costs arising from ine¢ cient pricing due to adverse selection; see Einav,
Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) for a discussion of some of this recent literature.
34contracts reimburse maxf￿;0g ￿ cj(maxf￿;0g) regardless of what the actual spending is. In such
situations, optimizing individuals would spend maxf￿;0g, which would be the socially e¢ cient level
of spending. Row 4 of Table 11 indicates that, relative to the status quo (row 1), this elimination of
moral hazard reduces spending by more than $1,100 per employee (column 3) and increases welfare
by about $490 per employee, which is an order of magnitude greater relative to the welfare gain
associated with eliminating adverse selection through perfect screening (row 2).
To examine the relative contribution of selection on moral hazard to this welfare cost, in row 5
we again consider an arti￿cial counterfactual. Speci￿cally, we assume that individuals make their
contract choices in the ￿rst period as if they are faced with the ￿perfect monitoring￿contracts (row
4), but then in the second period make their spending decision faced with the observed contracts
that reimburse in the same manner as the actual contracts (i.e., reimburse based on m rather than
based on ￿). This allows us to isolate the welfare gain from eliminating solely selection on moral
hazard, while preserving the distortion in second period consumption caused by moral hazard. The
results suggest that eliminating selection on moral hazard can achieve welfare gains of $25 per
employee, or only about 5 percent of the total welfare cost of moral hazard (row 4).
Overall, these results suggest that, in our setting, selection on moral hazard contributes non-
trivially to the total welfare cost of selection, but contributes much less relative to the total welfare
cost of moral hazard. At a broad level, our ￿ndings suggest that in thinking about contract
design, traditional approaches to combatting moral hazard may well aid in combatting selection,
and possibly vice versa. Of course, our quantitative estimates undoubtedly depend on our speci￿c
setting (contracts and population) and on our modeling assumptions. While there is not much we
can do about the former (at least in the current paper), we investigate the latter in the next section.
6.7 Robustness
Table 12 brie￿ y explores the robustness of some of our main ￿ndings. Overall, we ￿nd that the main
results are quite stable across alternative speci￿cations. All the alternative speci￿cations we explore
give rise to quantitatively similar estimates of average moral hazard (column (1)), heterogeneity in
moral hazard (column (2)), selection on moral hazard (column (4)), the implications of accounting
for selection on moral hazard for the spending reduction that can be achieved by o⁄ering a high
deductible plan (column (5) vs. column (1)), and the contribution of selection on moral hazard to
the overall welfare cost of adverse selection (columns (7) relative to column (6)).
The ￿rst row replicates our baseline ￿ndings reported earlier. The next two rows explore the
sensitivity of our ￿ndings to trying to account for various institutional features that our baseline
speci￿cation abstracted from. Row 2 explores the sensitivity of our ￿ndings to trying to account for
the fact that the lowest coverage option under the new options (option 1) has a health reimbursement
account (HRA) component (see Section 2 for details) which we abstracted from in our econometric
speci￿cation. To do so, we simply drop from the sample the 2004 observations associated with
employees who chose option 1 when o⁄ered the new choice set (roughly 6 percent of those o⁄ered
the new choice set).
35Row 3 provides one way of gauging the potential importance of ￿passive choices￿for our results.
As noted earlier, an attraction of our setting is that for employees who are o⁄ered the new choice
set in 2004, there is no option of staying with their existing plan. However, there were defaults for
those who did not make an ￿active￿choice under the new options. To account for ￿and exclude
￿a set of potentially passive choosers, we identi￿ed all individuals whose coverage choices under
the new bene￿t options for each of ￿ve di⁄erent insurance options (health, drug, dental, short-
term disability, and long-term disability) are consistent with the defaults for those ￿ve options.40
Row 3 shows the results of excluding the 2004 observations for the approximately 12 percent of
individuals o⁄ered the new options for whom all of their coverage decisions are consistent with the
default options.
The remaining rows of the table investigate the sensitivity of our ￿ndings to some alternative
natural parameterizations of the model. In row 4 we remove all of the demographic covariates
from the model (i.e., age, gender, job tenure, income, and health risk score) leaving only indicator
variables for year and treatment group (to capture the quasi-experimental variation in the option
set) and coverage tier dummies (because the prices of the options depend on coverage tier). In
row 5 we allow for heteroskedastic errors, by letting all the parameters in the variance-covariance
matrix (see equation (13)) depend on all the covariates. In row 6, instead of assuming that log!i,
log i, and ￿￿;i are drawn from a joint normal distribution, we assume that they are drawn from
a mixture of two normals.
While there is, of course, a potentially limitless set of alternative speci￿cations one could in-
vestigate, we found the stability of the core results to the natural ones we tried reassuring about
the stability of our model estimates within our context. As noted previously, whether or not the
results would generalize ￿quantitatively or even qualitatively ￿to other option sets, populations,
or di⁄erent models of coverage choice and utilization ￿is of course an open question.
7 Conclusions
This paper takes a ￿rst step toward marrying empirical analysis of selection with that of moral
hazard. The active (and growing) empirical literature on insurance demand has focused almost ex-
clusively on selection on risk type or risk preferences, and largely abstracted from moral hazard.41
The large and venerable literature on moral hazard in insurance has largely focused on average
moral hazard e⁄ects, abstracting from potential heterogeneity as well as potential selection on that
heterogeneity. In this paper we introduced the (to our knowledge) previously overlooked poten-
tial for selection on moral hazard, or in other words, the possibility that individuals￿anticipated
behavioral response to insurance contracts a⁄ects their contract choice.
40Employees make their choices for each insurance domain all at the same time, on the same bene￿t worksheet
during open enrollment period. Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu, and Cullen (2010) provide more detail and discussion of
these other bene￿ts options and choices.
41See Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) for a recent discussion of this literature.
36We explored the existence, nature, and implications of selection on moral hazard empirically in
the context of the employer-provided market for health insurance in the United States. We estimate
substantial heterogeneity in moral hazard and selection on it, with individuals who have a greater
behavioral response to the contract (i.e., greater ￿moral hazard type￿ ) demanding more coverage.
We estimate that ￿moral hazard type￿is roughly as important as health expectations in determining
whether to buy a higher or lower deductible. In other words, selection based on the expected slope
of spending (i.e., incremental spending due to insurance) appears about as quantitatively important
in our setting as ￿traditional￿selection based on the expected level of spending (i.e., health risk
type). Such selection on moral hazard can have important implications for traditional analysis of
either selection or moral hazard. For example, we estimate that if we ignored selection on moral
hazard, we could estimate a spending reduction associated with introducing a high deductible plan
that is substantially larger than what we estimate when we account for the fact that those who select
the high deductible plan have a disproportionately low behavioral response to such cost sharing.
Needless to say, our quantitative estimates are highly speci￿c to our particular population and
our particular counterfactual analyses. Nonetheless, at a broad level, they illustrate the potential
importance of selection on moral hazard for understanding the welfare consequences of both se-
lection and moral hazard. They also illustrate some of the potential implications of selection on
moral hazard for policies designed to ameliorate these welfare costs. They suggest, for example,
that e⁄orts to reduce health spending by introducing health insurance options with high consumer
cost sharing ￿such as the high deductible plans available through Health Savings Accounts ￿may
produce substantially smaller spending reductions than would have been expected based on the
existing estimates of moral hazard e⁄ects in health insurance which has ignored selection on moral
hazard. They also suggest that improvements in monitoring technology ￿traditionally thought
of as a way to reduce moral hazard ￿may have the ancillary bene￿t of ameliorating some of the
welfare costs of selection.
Given the importance of the topic, we hope that future work will explore selection on moral
hazard in other contexts and in other ways. As noted, we know of very little work that even examines
heterogeneity in moral hazard e⁄ects, let alone selection of insurance on this heterogeneity. Both
the approaches taken in this paper and those suggested (but not explored) by Einav, Finkelstein and
Cullen (2010, Section III.D) for estimating heterogeneity in moral hazard e⁄ects and its correlation
with demand should be fruitful to apply in other settings. In addition, our analysis has focused
exclusively on the spending and welfare implications of selection on moral hazard for a given set of
contracts; it would be interesting to consider, both theoretically and empirically, the implications
of selection on moral hazard for richer analyses of contract designs.
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39Figure 1: The cross-sectional distribution of medical expenditure
The ￿gure presents the distribution of total annual medical expenditure for each employee (and any covered
dependents) in our baseline sample. The graph uses a log scale, such that the second bin covers expenditure
lower than exp(0.5), the next covers expenditures between exp(0.5) and exp(1), and so on; the x-axis labels
show the corresponding dollar amounts of selected bins. An observation is an employee-year, pooling data
from 2003 and 2004. The grey bars correspond to employees with a single coverage, while the black bars
correspond to employees who also covered additional dependents (spouse, children, or both).
40Figure 2: Model ￿t ￿medical spending distributions
The ￿gure presents the distribution of total annual medical expenditure, in the data and in model simulations
based on the estimated parameters. The graph uses a log scale, such that the second bin covers expenditure
lower than exp(0.5), the next covers expenditures between exp(0.5) and exp(1), and so on; the x-axis labels
show the corresponding dollar amounts of selected bins. The top panel compares spending of individuals
who faced the original options, and the bottom panel compares the spending distribution of individuals who
faced the new options.
41Figure 3: Selection on moral hazard relative to other sources of selection
The ￿gure illustrates the relative importance of the three di⁄erent sources of selection that we model.
We consider an individual￿ s choice between two available options: the no deductible and high deductible
plans among the new set of options (see Table 2, options 5 and 1 respectively). We assume the observed
(averaged within each coverage tier) premiums for these two options. Each point in the ￿gure indicates the
fraction of individuals choosing the high deductible (i.e. low coverage) option relative to the no deductible
(high coverage) option. We consider three sources of selection: E(￿) (risk), ! (moral hazard), and   (risk
aversion). For each of them, we compute the fraction choosing the high deductible at di⁄erent quantiles of
the distribution. In the top panel, we take into account the correlation between each component and the
others, while in the bottom panel we repeat the same exercise but draw the other components of the model
randomly from their marginal distribution (that is, assuming no correlation).
42Figure 4: Spending implications of selection on moral hazard
The ￿gure illustrates the potential spending implications arising from selection on moral hazard. To construct
the table, we use an exercise similar to the one used for Figure 3. For each individual, we use the model
estimates to compute his decline in expected annual expenditure as we move him from the highest coverage
(no deductible) to the lowest coverage (high deductible) in the new bene￿ts options (see Table 2, options 5 and
1 respectively). We then vary the relative price of the highest coverage, allowing employees to endogenously
choose between the two options, and report the per-employee expected decrease in spending for the group
of individuals who chooses the lowest coverage at each price. Without selection on moral hazard, the curve
would have been ￿ at. Selection on moral hazard implies that those with the lowest moral hazard e⁄ects of
insurance are those who have the lowest willingness to pay for incremental coverage and are therefore the
￿rst (as the price of coverage increases) to switch from higher to lower coverage. Ceteris paribus, therefore,
selection on moral hazard generates an upward sloping curve; this can be o⁄set through the correlation
between moral hazard and other components of demand (such as risk aversion or health risk).















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baseline sample 3,995 41.3 31,292 10.2 0.84 0.72 0.23 0.95 2.8
Switched in 2004 682 44.5 39,715 15.5 0.96 0.85 0.21 1.06 2.7
Switched in 2005 974 39.7 25,532 8.2 0.73 0.44 0.25 0.91 2.8
Switched in 2006 1,075 38.3 29,952 5.7 0.86 0.82 0.23 0.86 2.9
Switched after 2006 1,264 43.3 32,316 12.7 0.85 0.79 0.22 1.01 2.6
Top row presents statistics based on the 2003 data for our baseline sample, which covers all hourly union
workers not covered by the Master Steelworker￿ s Agreement (except those that get dropped in the process of
the data cleaning described in the text). The subsequent rows (￿Switched in 2004,￿￿Switched in 2005,￿and
so on) partition our baseline sample based on the year in which employees were switched to the new set of
health insurance options. Average health risk score in column (8) gives predicted spending for our population
(based on demographics and medical conditions) relative to a nationally representative population under age
65; see text for more details. Total annual medical spending in column (10) is for employees and any covered
dependents.
a Health risk score is normalized, so that 1 indicates the expected medical expenditure for a random draw
from a nationally representative under-65 population. To construct this table, we assign each employee the
average risk score of all covered family members.
44Table 2: Old and new health plans
Panel A: Single coverage (N=1,679)
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 1
a Option 2 Option  3 Option 4 Option 5
Plan features:
Deductible 1,000 0 0 1,500 750 500 250 0
Out of Pocket Maximum 5,000 2,500 1,000 4,500 3,750 3,500 2,750 2,500
Average Share of Spending Paid Out of Pocket
b 0.580 0.150 0.111 0.819 0.724 0.660 0.535 0.112
Employee Premium
c 0 351 1,222 0 132 224 336 496
Fraction choosing each option
d 3.3% 63.5% 33.2% 14.1% 0.0% 2.2% 37.8% 45.9%
Panel B: Non-single coverage (N=5,895)
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 1
a Option 2 Option  3 Option 4 Option 5
Plan features:
Deductible 2,000 0 0 3,000 1,500 1,000 500 0
Out of Pocket Maximum 10,000 5,000 2,000 9,000 7,500 7,000 5,500 5,000
Average Share of Spending Paid Out of Pocket
b 0.495 0.130 0.098 0.732 0.600 0.520 0.387 0.111
Employee Premium
c 0 354 1,297 0 364 620 914 1,306
Fraction choosing each option
d 0.6% 56.1% 43.3% 3.9% 0.6% 1.8% 24.4% 69.3%
Original Plan Options New Plan Options
Original Plan Options New Plan Options
The table summarizes the key features of the original and new health insurance coverage options. The
features shown apply to in-network spending. Not shown are coinsurance rates (applied to those who
reached the deductible but have yet to reach the out-of-pocket maximum) which are 10% in all plans (old
and new). There are some other small di⁄erences between the original and new options that are associated
with out-of-network spending, preventive care, and certain treatments associated with co-pays rather than
coinsurance in the original set of options. See text for further details.
a The New Option 1 includes a health reimbursement arrangement (HRA). Every year the employer sets aside $750
(for single; $1,250 for non-single coverage) that the employee can use (tax free) to pay for a variety of expenses
such as deductibles and coinsurance payments. Unused HRA funds roll over to future years and, eventually, can be
used during retirement to ￿nance health insurance, provided through the company or through COBRA. Our baseline
model abstracts from the HRA component of New Option 1.
b To compute the average share of spending out of pocket, we use the 2003 claims from all individuals in the baseline
sample and apply each option￿ s coverage details to this (common) sample. We then compute, for each option, the
ratio of the resultant out-of-pocket expenses to the total claim mounts, and report the average (across employees
in 2003) for each option. As a result, our computed average share of spending out of pocket abstracts from any
di⁄erential behavioral e⁄ect of each contract. It does, however, account for the unmodeled small di⁄erences between
the new and original options described above and in the text.
c Premiums are normalized so that the lowest coverage is free for all employees. This is true in both the original
and new options, up to small variation of several hundred dollars across employees. We report the average premium
for employees in the baseline sample, pooling 2003 and 2004. Premiums vary by coverage tier; there is also some
additional variation (across employees within coverage tier) in the incremental premiums associated with greater
coverage options. The variation is based on the business unit to which each employees belongs (see Einav, Finkelstein,
and Cullen, 2010).
d Statistics are based on all employee in the baseline sample, pooling 2003 and 2004.


























New options in 2004
The table shows transition matrices across plan options for those in the old options in both 2003 and 2004 (top panel)
and those who are switched to the new options in 2004 (bottom panel). Under the original options, the highest
coverage is option 3. Under the new options, the highest coverage in option 5. See Table 2 for coverage details. The
sample is limited to the 6186 employees (82% of the baseline sample) who are in the data in both 2003 and 2004.
Table 4: Spending patterns by coverage level
Count Mean Median Count Mean Median
Original Plan Options
   Highest coverage 512 3,130 557 2,318 6,634 2,670
   All other coverages 1,031 1,795 233 3,035 5,768 2,288
New Plan Options
   Highest coverage 62 1,650 447 375 6,858 2,630
   All other coverages 73 560 52 164 3,405 1,481
Single Coverage Non-Single Coverage
The table shows (contemporaneous) spending by coverage choice. Under the original options, the highest coverage is
option 3. Under the new options, the highest coverage is option 5. See Table 2 for coverage details.




10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Control (Switched after 2004)
2003 spending 3,313 5,300 0.09 52 426 1,775 5,178 11,984
2004 spending 2,901 5,250 0.09 55 517 1,889 5,589 12,253
Treated (Switched in 2004)
2003 spending 682 5,201 0.08 79 581 1,957 5,048 12,644
2004 spending 674 4,856 0.10 22 447 1,610 4,622 9,467
2003 spending -99 -0.01 27 155 182 -130 660
2004 spending -394 0.01 -33 -70 -279 -967 -2,786
2004-2003 Difference (levels)
Control (switched after 2004) -50 0.00 3 91 114 411 269
Treated (Switched in 2004) -345 0.02 -57 -134 -347 -426 -3,177
-295 0.02 -60 -225 -461 -837 -3,446
Difference (percentages)
Control (switched after 2004) -0.9% 0.0% 5.8% 21.4% 6.4% 7.9% 2.2%
Treated (Switched in 2004) -6.6% 22.0% -72.2% -23.1% -17.7% -8.4% -25.1%
Diff. in differences -5.7% 22.0% -77.9% -44.4% -24.2% -16.4% -27.4%
Treated-Control Differences (levels)
Difference in differences (levels)
Table 6: Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates of impact of change in health insurance options
on annual medical spending
OLS in levels OLS in logs QMLE-Poisson OLS in levels OLS in logs QMLE-Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimated Treatment effect -297.2 -0.35 -0.06 -591.8 -0.175 -0.114
(753.7) (0.19) (0.15) (264.2) (0.12) (0.048)
[0.70] [0.08] [0.69] [0.034] [0.17] [0.018]
Mean Dependent Variable 5,232 6.91 5,232 5,392 6.9 5,392
N 7,570 7,570 7,570 14,638 14,638 14,638
2003-2004 sample 2003-2006 sample
The table shows the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate of the spending reduction associated with moving from
the old options to the new options. The unit of observation is an employee-year. Dependent variable is the
total annual medical spending for each employee and any covered dependents (or log of 1 + total spending in
column (2) and column (5)). The coe¢ cient shown is the coe¢ cient on an indicator variable that is equal to
1 if the employee￿ s treatment group is o⁄ered the new health insurance options that year, and 0 otherwise.
All regressions include year and treatment group ￿xed e⁄ects. We classify employees into one of four possible
treatment groups - switched in 2004, switched in 2005, switched in 2006, or switched later - based on his
union a¢ liation which determines the year in which he is switched to the new health insurance options.
Estimation is either by OLS or QMLE Poisson as indicated in the column headings. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are adjusted for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each of the 28 unions; p-values
are in [square brackets]. Columns (1)-(3) show estimates for the 2003-2004 sample; Columns (3)-(6) expand
the sample to include 2003-2006.
47Table 7: Suggestive evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard and of selection on moral hazard
Coeff. Std. Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Above median age (of 43) 6,972 6,263 -1,302 (799) 12.4 27.8 15.4
Below or equal to median age (of 43) 7,666 4,600 -85.8 (483) 12.9 29.5 16.6
Male 12,373 5,442 -604 (293) 12.6 29.1 16.5
Female 2,265 5,120 -579 (693) 12.9 25.8 12.9
Above median income (of $31,000) 7,322 5,669 -364 (602) 12.2 29.1 16.9
Below median income (of $31,000) 7,316 5,116 -301 (397) 13 28.1 15.1
Above median health 7,320 3,321 488 (330) 15.3 31 15.7
Below median health 7,318 7,462 -1525 (540) 14.7 25.9 11.2
Less coverage in 2003 6,997 5,003 -621 (513) 13.4 32 18.6













Estimated change in spending associated






The table shows results for di⁄erent groups of workers (shown in di⁄erent rows) in the 2003-2006 sample.
Column (1) reports the number of employee-years in the sample, and column (2) reports their mean annual
medical spending over the sample period. Columns (3) and (4) report, respectively, the coe¢ cient and
standard error of the estimated change in spending associated with moving from the old to the new options.
This is based on a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences regression on the 2003-2006 sample; we report in columns (3) and
(4) the coe¢ cient and standard error on an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the employee￿ s treatment
group is o⁄ered the new health insurance options that year, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is always
total annual medical spending for each employee and any covered dependents. All regressions include year
and treatment group ￿xed e⁄ects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix within each of the 28 unions. Columns (5) and (6) show the average out of pocket share
within each group under the old and new options respectively. These are calculated based on the share of
employees within each group in each plan, and the plan speci￿c out of pocket shares shown in Table 2 (which
are computed on a common sample of workers across plans). Column (7) reports the increase in the average
out of pocket share for each group associated with moving from the old options to the new options. In panel
(D), the sample is split into above and below median health based on the employee￿ s health risk score, which
is a prediction of future medical spending on the basis of prior year detailed medical diagnoses and claims,
as well as demographics. In panel (E), the sample is limited to employees who are employed at the ￿rm in
2003 and who choose either ￿more coverage￿(option 3 from Table 2) or ￿less coverage￿(option 2 from Table
2) in 2003.
48Table 8(a): Parameter estimates
Mean Shifters
μ λ κ λ ln(ω) ln(ψ)
(Health risk) (Health risk) (Moral hazard) (Risk aversion)
Constant 6.11 (0.14) -389 (73) 5.31 (0.24) -5.57 (0.10)
Coverage tier
   Single (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
   Family  0.19 (0.08) 57 (51) -0.58 (0.18) -0.88 (0.07)
   Emp+Spouse  0.27 (0.09) 44 (53) -0.66 (0.22) -0.95 (0.07)
   Emp+Children  0.24 (0.08) 185 (47) -0.28 (0.21) -0.91 (0.06)
Treatment group
   Switch 2004 -0.01 (0.07) -278 (43) -0.24 (0.11) -0.31 (0.05)
   Switch 2005 -0.10 (0.06) -78 (38) 0.07 (0.12) -0.23 (0.05)
   Switch 2006  0.12 (0.07) -94 (37) 0.01 (0.12) -0.07 (0.05)
   Switch later (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Demographics
Age   -0.01   (0.003)      -5    (1.8) -0.01 (0.006)    0.01    (0.002)
Female  0.18   (0.08)    94    (39) -0.08 (0.13) -0.07    (0.06)
Job Tenure    0.002 (0.003)      -2.3 (1.6) 0.002 (0.004)  0.003   (0.002)
Income    0.003 (0.002)       6    (0.9) 0.001 (0.003) -0.0003 (0.001)
Health risk score
   1st  quartile (< 1.119) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
   2nd quartile (1.119 to 1.863) 0.91 (0.07)   305 (59) 0.13 (0.29) -0.41 (0.06)
   3rd  quartile (1.863 to 2.834) 1.48 (0.08)   242 (81) 1.79 (0.27) -0.66 (0.06)
   4th  quartile (> 2.834) 2.05 (0.09)   -416 (120) 3.38 (0.22) -0.89 (0.07)
2004 Time dummy -0.12 (0.02) -- -- --
Variance-covariance matrix
μ λ_bar ln(ω) ln(ψ)
μ λ_bar 0.20 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04) -0.12 (0.02)
ln(ω) --  0.98 (0.08) -0.01 (0.03)
ln(ψ) -- --  0.25 (0.02)
Additional parameters
σ μ 0.33 (0.03)
σ κ 290 (12)
 g1 0.04 (0.004)
g2 15 (1.2)
The table presents our baseline parameter estimates based on our baseline sample of 7,570 employees. As
described in the text, the estimates are based on a Gibbs sampler; the table reports the posterior mean and
the posterior standard deviations in parentheses. All time varying demographics are set to their mean over
the two years, except for health risk score which we allow to be a time varying shifter of ￿￿: ￿Treatment
group￿dummies refer to indicator variables based on the year your union￿ s bene￿ts were switched to the
new bene￿ts. Higher risk scores correspond to worse predicted health.
49Table 8(b): Implied quantities
Unconditional statistics
E(λ) ω ψ
   Average 4,340 (200) 1,330 (59) 0.0019 (0.00002)
   Std. Deviation 5,130 (343) 3,190 (320) 0.0020 (0.00007)
Unconditional correlations
E(λ) ω ψ
E(λ) 1.00 0.24 (0.03) -0.36 (0.01)
ω -- 1.00 -0.15 (0.01)
ψ -- -- 1.00
Marginal Effects on E(λ)
Coverage tier
   Single (omitted)
   Family 360 (75)
   Emp+Spouse 700 (85)
   Emp+Children 300 (69)
Treatment group
   Switch 2004 260 (71)
   Switch 2005 -320 (67)
   Switch 2006 640 (70)




Job Tenure 5.9 (3.1)
Income 13 (2)
Health risk score
   1st  quartile (< 1.119) (omitted)
   2nd quartile (1.119 to 1.863) 1,600 (96)
   3rd  quartile (1.863 to 2.834) 4,000 (200)
   4th  quartile (> 2.834) 8,500 (370)
2004 Time dummy -590 (29)
The table reports some implied quantities of interest that are derived from the estimated parameters in Table
8(a). Posterior standard deviations are in parentheses.
50Table 9: Model ￿t ￿choice probabilities
Original options (N = 6,896)
Plan Data Model
Option 1 1.2% 2.0%
Option 2 58% 57%
Option 3 41% 41%
New options (N = 674)
Plan Data Model
Option 1 5.9% 5.0%
Option 2 0.5% 5.0%
Option 3 1.9% 1.0%
Option 4 27% 11%
Option 5 65% 76%
The table reports the actual and predicted choice probabilities of each plan. Plans are numbered from lowest
to highest coverage. For plan details see Table 2.
Table 10: Spending implications of moral hazard estimates
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Spending difference as we move
from no to high deductible plan
348 749 0 0 48 316 1,028
Spending difference as we move
from full to no insurance
1,273 3,181 0 86 310 1,126 3,236
The table reports the implied spending implications if we move di⁄erent employees across plans. For each
employee, we use the model estimates to compute his decline in expected annual expenditure as we change
his insurance plan. In the top row, we move each employee from the highest coverage option under the new
bene￿t options (option 5) to the lowest coverage option under the new bene￿t options (option 1); roughly
speaking, this entails moving from a plan with no deducible to a plan with a high deductible; see Table 2
for more details. In the bottom row, we move each employee from full to no insurance. The table then
summarizes the cross-sectional distribution of the spending e⁄ects. The estimates are primarily driven by
the estimated distribution of !, but they take into account the truncation of spending at zero by integrating
over the conditional (on !) distribution of ￿:









(1) "Status quo": no screening or monitoring 1,568 0.90 5,318 normalized to 0
(2)
"Perfect screening": premiums depend on
F(lambda) and omega
1,491 0.91 5,248 52
(3)
"Imperfect screening": premiums depend
on omega (but not on F(lambda))
1,523 0.88 5,265 34
(4)
"Perfect monitoring": contracts reimburse
only "lambda-related" spending
1,139 0.94 4,185 490
(5)
"Imperfect monitoring": perfect monitoring
assumed for choice (but not for utilization)
1,139 0.94 5,327 25
The table reports the spending and welfare e⁄ects from a set of counterfactual contracts described in the text.
All exercises are applied to a setting in which the only two options available are the no deductible plan and
the high deductible plan under the new bene￿t options (i.e. option 5 and option 1, respectively; see Table 2).
Equilibrium premiums are computed as the incremental (relative) premium for the no deductible plan that
equals the expected incremental costs associated with providing the no deductible plan to those who choose
it. The no deductible plan share is calculated based on the choice probabilities as a function of equilibrium
premiums. Expected spending and total welfare are computed based on these choices. Row 1 assumes the
￿status quo￿asymmetric information contracts, which a ￿uniform￿price that varies only by coverage tier.
Row 2 assumes ￿perfect screening￿ , so that contracts are priced based on !i and all components of Fi(￿) and
adverse selection is eliminated. Row 3 assumes ￿imperfect screening￿ , in which contracts are priced based only
on !i:Row 4 assumes ￿perfect monitoring￿so that moral hazard is eliminated. Speci￿cally we assume the insurance
provider can counterfactually observe (and not reimburse) spending that is associated with moral hazard;
spending associated with health ￿realization of ￿ ￿are reimbursed according to the observed contracts. Row
5 assumes ￿imperfect monitoring￿in which, ex ante individuals choose contracts under the assumption that
there will be perfect monitoring (i.e. spending associated with moral hazard will not be reimbursed), but
ex-post (after they choose their contract but before they make their spending decision) the contracts are





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Baseline specification 348 2.15 24.2% 22.9% 131 52 34
(2) Omitting new option 1 424 1.98 23.3% 23.0% 160 61 43
(3) Omitting potentially passive choosers 336 2.18 26.9% 19.8% 153 56 36
(4) No demographic covariates 270 2.11 27.4% 21.4% 114 33 16
(5) Allowing heteroskedasticity 277 2.18 20.1% 18.0% 112 58 28


















The table reports summary results from a variety of speci￿cations. Column 1 (￿average moral hazard
e⁄ect￿ ) reports the average (per employee) reduction in spending associated with moving everyone from the
no deductible plan to the high deductible plan under the new bene￿t options (i.e. option 5 and option 1
respectively) and column 2 (￿moral hazard: coe¢ cient of variation￿ ) reports the standard deviation of this
e⁄ect relative to the mean; the baseline numbers are shown in Table 10, row 1. Columns 3 and 4 report the
di⁄erence in the probability an individual chooses the high deductible plan compared to the no deductible
plan (if it is priced so that on average 10 percent of the population chooses the high deductible plan) by the
quantiles of the marginal distribution of risk type (E(￿)) and the quantiles of the marginal distribution of
moral hazard (!), respectively; the baseline estimates are shown in Figure 3a. Column 5 reports the average
(per employee) reduction in spending for those who choose the high deductible plan when, starting from the
no deductible plan, the price of the high deductible plan is set so that only 10 percent of employees select
the high deductible plan (see Figure 4 for the baseline estimate). Columns 6 and 7 show, respectively, the
welfare gain from ￿perfect screening￿￿i.e. contracts are priced based on !i and all components of Fi(￿) and
adverse selection is eliminated ￿and the welfare gain from ￿imperfect screening￿￿i.e. contracts are priced based
only on !i; the baseline results were shown in Table 11, rows 2 and 3 respectively.
Each row reports the results from a di⁄erent speci￿cation . Row 1 replicates the baseline speci￿cation. All other rows
show a single deviation from the baseline as speci￿ed. Row 2 shows the results omitting the employees who chose the
new option 1 in 2004. Row 3 shows the results omitting individuals who may potentially be ￿passive choosers￿in
2004. Row 4 omits all of the demographic covariates from the baseline speci￿cation (age, gender, job tenure, income,
and health risk score), leaving only dummies for coverage tier, year your bene￿ts were switched, and whether it is
2004. Row 5 allows the variance-covariance matrix (see equation (13)) to depend on the covariates. Row 6 allows
the joint distribution of the latent variables (in equation (13)) to be more ￿ exible by allowing it to follow a mixture
of two normal distributions.
53Appendix A: Additional descriptive results on moral hazard
In this appendix we report in more detail on the results of our di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences analysis of the impact
of the change in health insurance options on healthcare spending and utilization. Speci￿cally, we estimate
the impact of the change in coverage separately for di⁄erent types of healthcare utilization, investigate the
validity of our identifying assumption, and explore a number of other additional potential concerns with the
analysis. All of the results shown are for the 2003-2006 sample.
Econometric framework The basic di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences speci￿cation (which we used in Tables 5 and
6) is:
yijt = ￿j + ￿t + ￿ ￿ Treatjt + x
0
ijt￿+"ijt; (17)
where yijt is the outcome variable of interest for employee i in treatment group j at time t. We classify each
employee i into one of four possible treatment groups ￿￿switched in 2004,￿￿switched in 2005,￿￿switched in
2006,￿and ￿switched later￿￿based on his union a¢ liation which determines the year in which he is switched
to the new set of health insurance options. The coe¢ cients ￿j represent a full set of treatment group ￿xed
e⁄ects; these control for any ￿xed di⁄erences across treatment groups. The vector of ￿t ￿ s represents a full set
of year ￿xed e⁄ects; these control (￿ exibly) for any common secular year-to-year changes across all treatment
groups.42 The vector x denotes a set of employee demographic covariates that are included in some of our
speci￿cations; there are no such covariates in our baseline speci￿cation. We adjust the standard errors to
allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each of the 28 di⁄erent unions in our sample.43
The main coe¢ cient of interest is ￿, the coe¢ cient on the variable Treatjt. The variable Treatjt is an
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if group j is o⁄ered the new health insurance options in year t, and 0
otherwise. For example, for the group ￿switched in 2004￿Treatjt is 0 in 2003, and 1 in 2004 and subsequent
years, while for the ￿switched later￿group the variable Treatjt is 0 in all years.
Impact on types of medical spending and care utilization Appendix Table A1 examines the impact
of the change in health insurance options on the various components of health care spending and health
care utilization. We can break out health care spending into doctor visits (approximately 25 percent of
the total), outpatient spending (approximately 35 percent of the total), inpatient spending (approximately
35 percent of the total), and other (which accounts for about 4 percent of spending, about half of which
42An annual measure is a natural unit of time since it is both the unit of time during which the set of health
insurance incentives apply (i.e., cost sharing requirements reset at the beginning of the year) and the time over which
the choice of health insurance contract is made. In some additional analysis below we also report results at the
quarterly level, which allows for a ￿ner examination of pre- and post-period dynamics.
43Ideally, we would allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each of the four treatment groups, but
we are concerned about small sample biases with such few clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011). Below we
report alternative results aggregated to the treatment group level in which we estimate the model by Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) and allow for both heterosketasticity as well as treatment-group speci￿c auto-correlation parameters.
These tend to produce similar point estimates and smaller standard errors relative to our baseline speci￿cation.
54is due to emergency room visits). Column (1) shows our baseline results for 2003-2006 for total spending
(i.e., Table 6, column (4)). It indicates that the change from the old health insurance options to the new
health insurance options was associated with, on average, a $591 (11 percent) reduction in annual medical
spending.
Columns (2) through (5) show estimates separately for spending on doctor visits, spending on outpatient
visits, spending on inpatient visits and other spending. We detect a statistically signi￿cant decline in annual
doctor spending of $220 (15 percent) and in annual outpatient spending of $310 (16 percent). The point
estimates for inpatient spending suggest a statistically insigni￿cant decline in inpatient spending of $117 (6
percent).
In addition to spending, we are able to measure utilization on the extensive margin. We de￿ne doctor
visits as the total number of doctor visits by anyone in the household covered by the insurance (limited to
a maximum of one per day). On average, an employee has 12 doctor visits for covered members in a given
year. Outpatient visits are de￿ned in an identical manner, where the average is 3 outpatient visits per year.
We also code an indicator variable for whether there are any inpatient hospitalizations for anyone insured
over the year; on average 14 percent of the employees have an inpatient hospitalization in a given year.
Columns (6) through (8) show the estimated e⁄ects on these measures of utilization. We estimate that
the change in health insurance options is associated with a statistically and economically signi￿cant decline
in the average number of annual doctor visits 1.9 (16 percent). Given the average cost of a doctor visit in
our data of about $115, it is possible that the decline in spending on doctor visits comes entirely on the
extensive margin. There is no evidence of an economically or statistically signi￿cant impact of the change in
health insurance options on outpatient visits or inpatient hospitalization. The estimated decline in outpatient
spending therefore presumably re￿ ects a decrease in the intensity of treatment (i.e., spending conditional on
the visit).
Validity of identifying assumption The identifying assumption in interpreting the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
￿ coe¢ cient from equation (17) as the causal impact of the change in health insurance options on the outcome
of interest is that absent the change in health insurance options, employees in the di⁄erent treatment groups
would have otherwise experienced similar changes in their healthcare utilization or spending. Employees
who are switched at di⁄erent times di⁄er in some of their demographics as well as in their 2003 (pre period)
spending (see Table 1).Such observable di⁄erences across the treatment groups is not a problem per se for our
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences analysis which uses group ￿xed e⁄ects and therefore controls for any time-invariant
di⁄erences across the treatment group. It naturally, however, raises concerns about the validity of our
identifying assumption.
We undertake two types of analysis designed to help shed light on the likely validity of the identifying
assumption. First, as our most direct investigations, we examine whether outcomes were trending similarly
across the di⁄erent groups in the periods prior to the change in health insurance options. These results are
quite reassuring; there is no evidence of any substantively or statistically signi￿cant declines in spending
in the several quarters prior to the change in health insurance options. Second, as a more indirect inves-
tigation, we also examine the sensitivity of our baseline results to controlling for observable characteristics
of the employees. Again, it is quite reassuring that the basic OLS estimate in the 2003-2006 sample is not
55particularly sensitive to controlling for observable worker characteristics.
Dynamics. To compare pre-period trends across the treatment groups we disaggregated the data from
the annual to the quarterly level (so that t now denotes quarters rather than years) and estimate:
yijt = ￿j + ￿t + ￿ ￿ Treatjt + ￿ ￿ Treatjt;0 + "ijt (18)
where Treatjt;0 is an indicator variable for whether it is the quarter before group j is switched to the
new health insurance options. The variable Treatjt;0 acts as a pre-speci￿cation test; it will be informative
of whether there are any di⁄erential trends in the outcome variables of interest across di⁄erent treatment
groups before the change in health insurance options. We estimate equation (18) at the quarterly rather
than annual level primarily because at the annual level we would not be able to estimate pre period trends
for the ￿rst treatment group (who is switched in 2004) which is roughly one-￿fth of our sample, as there is
only one year (2003) of pre data for this group. Another advantage of the quarterly speci￿cation is that it
allows us to test for anticipation e⁄ects which presumably are most likely to occur immediately prior to the
switch.44
Appendix Table A2 reports the results from estimating equation (18). In the interest of brevity, we
report results for total spending only; results from components of spending (or utilization) are broadly
similar (not shown). Column (1) reports the results from estimating equation (18) without the pre-period
speci￿cation variable Treatjt;0 . It is therefore the exact analog of equation (17) but at the quarterly level
rather than annual level. Correspondingly, therefore, the estimated coe¢ cient on Treatjt is one-quarter
the level of what we estimated in column (4) of Table 6. Column (2) of Table A2 shows the results when
the pre-period variable Treatjt;0 is included in the regression. The estimated main e⁄ect (the coe¢ cient
on Treatjt) is virtually una⁄ected by the inclusion of this additional variable, although the standard error
increases noticeably. More importantly, the coe¢ cient on the pre-period speci￿cation test variable Treatjt;0
is the opposite sign, statistically insigni￿cant, and less than one-third the magnitude of the main e⁄ect.
This goes some way toward assuaging concerns that the estimated e⁄ect is just picking up di⁄erential trends
across groups.
A potential concern with quarterly level data is that results may be much more sensitive to outliers. To
investigate this concern, in columns (3) and (4) we repeat the analysis in columns (1) and (2) but censor
the dependent variable at the 99th percentile. Comparing columns (1) and (3), we see very similar point
estimates on the estimated treatment e⁄ect (-148 in the uncensored estimate in column (1) and -157 in the
censored estimate in column (3)) but a substantially lower standard error (65.76 vs. 43.62); this comparison
is consistent with little or no economic incentive e⁄ect at the 99th percentile and therefore the introduction
of noise from including the estimates above this point.45 The pre-speci￿cation test on the censored data in
44In speci￿cations at the quarterly level the ￿t represent a full set of quarter-of-year ￿xed e⁄ects rather than year
￿xed e⁄ects.
45The 99th percentile of the spending distribution is $57,500 for non-single coverage and $29,600 for single coverage.
This level exceeds the out-of-pocket maximum on all plans with any non trivial mass except for the lowest coverage
option (option 1) under the new plan options (see Table 2). Censoring the data at a spending level above the out
of pocket maximum of the lowest coverage plan is conceptually valid since any spending above this amount cannot
56column (4) shows a virtually identical main e⁄ect to the censored estimate in column (3), however now the
pre period e⁄ect is not only statistically insigni￿cant but substantively trivial (with a coe¢ cient of -0.3.31
(standard error = 69) it is about two orders of magnitude smaller the main e⁄ect with a coe¢ cient of -
157). Finally, in column (5), as a further check on the validity of the identifying assumption, we re-estimate
equation (18) with the addition of treatment-group speci￿c linear trends; this allows each treatment group
to be on a di⁄erent (linear) trend over the 2003-2006 period and investigates whether the switch in health
insurance options is associated with a change in spending for the treatment group relative to its average
trend, relative to the changes in spending experienced at the same calendar time by other treatment groups
relative to their own trends. The fact that the main estimate remains quite similar in magnitude is consistent
with the evidence that these groups are not in fact on very di⁄erent trends which are driving the estimated
e⁄ect of the change in health insurance.
To more thoroughly examine the full range of pre-period dynamics, as well as to examine the dynamics
in the timing of the post-period in any impact of the change in health insurance regime on the outcomes
of interest, we also estimate a more ￿ exible version of this quarterly speci￿cation that includes a full set of
dummies for the number of quarters it has been since (or until) the switch. Speci￿cally, we estimate
yijt = ￿j + ￿t +
12 X
k=￿11
￿kSwitchijt;k + "ijt; (19)
where Switchijt;k is an indicator variable for whether individual i is in a group j which at time t is k quarters
away from the switch in health insurance options. The period k = 1 corresponds to the ￿rst quarter in which
the group is under the new health insurance options, while k = 0 corresponds to the quarter right before
the switch to the new health insurance options, etc. Thus, for example, for the ￿Switched in 2004￿group,
Switchijt;1is turned on (equal to 1) in the ￿rst quarter of 2004, while Switchijt;￿3 is turned on the ￿rst
quarter of 2003, and Switchijt;12 is turned on in the last quarter of 2006; for the ￿Switched later￿group, all
Switchijt;k variables are set to 0. We examine periods from k = ￿11 (i.e., 12 quarters or 3 years before the
switch) through k = 12 (i.e., 12 quarters or 3 years after the switch) although of course not all treatment
groups can be used in identifying each of these periods (a point we return to below).
The coe¢ cients of interest are the time pattern on the ￿
0
ks; the coe¢ cients on the Switchijt;k indicators.
Column (6) of Table A2 shows the coe¢ cients on the ￿k￿ s from estimating equation (19) on the outcome
variable of total spending. We show (and focus our attention on) only the four quarters before and four
quarters after the switch, since these are all identi￿ed o⁄ of the full sample; by contrast, coe¢ cients further
removed from k = 0 are identi￿ed o⁄ of only some of the groups; as a result, the time pattern at longer
intervals potentially con￿ ates the true time pattern with heterogeneous treatment e⁄ects across the groups
identifying di⁄erent coe¢ cients.46 We observe two interesting (and reassuring) features of the time pattern.
be a⁄ected by the cost-sharing features of the plan, except via income e⁄ects. To the extent that our censoring
level is lower than the highest out of pocket maximum, censoring the dependent variable should bias downward
our estimated e⁄ect of increased cost sharing. In practice, the results in Appendix Table A2 do not suggest any
substantive downward bias.
46For example, employees in the ￿Switched in 2006￿group do not contribute to the identi￿cation of the parameter
57First, we can see that the decline in spending after the switch to the new regime happens pretty much
instantaneously. This is reassuring as the timing of the e⁄ect suggests that we are estimating the e⁄ect of
the change in plans, rather than some confounding factor. Second, there is no systematic trend in spending
in the quarters before the switch for select relative to other groups with other timing; while the pattern is
admittedly quite noisy it is relatively ￿ at. This is re-assuring in further supporting the likely validity of the
identifying assumption that absent this change in plans, the di⁄erent groups would have been on similar
trends in spending.
Sensitivity to covariates. An alternative way to shed light on the likely validity of the identifying assumption
is to explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of covariates. Appendix Table A3 explores these
issues. This analysis is all done at an annual level. Column (1) replicates the baseline results from Table
6, column (4). Column (2) of Table A3 shows the results with the addition of controls for coverage tier.
Column (3) adds controls for a wider set of employee demographic characteristics: in addition to whether
they have single coverage, we control for their age, gender, risk score, the number of dependents insured on
the policy, whether they are white, the number of years they have been at Alcoa, and their annual salary;
this speci￿cation is shown to mimic the one we used in our baseline modeling approach below. The results
in columns (1) through (3) indicate the results are not sensitive ￿in either magnitude or precision ￿to
controlling for employee demographics; the baseline estimate of a $591 decline in spending associated with
the move to the new PPO options changes to a $523 or $537 when the controls are added. As a stronger
set of controls, we can include individual ￿xed e⁄ects for employees in the sample for more than one year.
Column (4) shows the baseline results limited to the approximately half of employees who are in our data
in all four years. The point estimate of the decline in spending associated with the move to the new PPO
options is noticeably larger ($966) in this subsample, presumably re￿ ecting heterogeneity in treatment e⁄ects
and/or the treatment (i.e., plan selection) itself. More interestingly for our purposes, column (5) shows that
the point estimate is una⁄ected ($966) by the inclusion of individual ￿xed e⁄ects in this subsample. Overall,
we view the robustness of our results to various inclusions of covariates as reassuring with respect to the
validity of the identifying assumption.
Additional sensitivity analyses Finally, Appendix Table A4 explores a variety of additional concerns and
sensitivity analysis. One concern, noted earlier, is with sample selection. Speci￿cally, we excluded from our
analysis the 11 percent of employees who choose to opt out of insurance or choose the HMO option (available
in all years and to all our employees) rather than one of the PPO options we study. To the extent that
the new PPO options were more or less attractive to employees ￿in either their bene￿t design and/or their
pricing ￿this raises concerns that our treatment variable (the o⁄ering of the new PPO options) could a⁄ect
selection out of our sample and thus bias our estimates. To investigate this, we added back in the excluded
individuals and re-estimated equation (17) for the binary dependent variable of whether the employee chose
a non PPO option (i.e., is excluded from our baseline sample). The results indicate that the new options
are associated with a statistically insigni￿cant and economically small 2.1 percentage point decline in the
estimates beyond the third quarter under the new policy, while individuals in the ￿Switched in 2004￿group do not
contribute to the identi￿cation of the parameter estimates beyond the third quarter prior to the policy.
58probability of an employee choosing a non PPO option. We suspect this re￿ ects the fact that the excluded
options are su¢ ciently horizontally di⁄erentiated from the PPO options that they are largely determined
by other factors (outside insurance options, taste for HMO plan, etc.) and thus not that sensitive on the
margin to redesigns of the PPO options; consistent with this, in Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010) we
￿nd that variation in the relative prices of the ￿ve new PPO options also does not have an economically or
statistically signi￿cant association with the decision to choose one of these non PPO options. This is also
consistent with Handel (2010)￿ s ￿nding ￿in the context of a di⁄erent employer provided health insurance
setting ￿that individuals in a PPO are unlikely to subsequently choose an HMO when the set of HMO and
PPO options change.
Another concern noted above was the treatment of the standard errors. Our baseline speci￿cation adjusts
for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each of the 28 unions (whose contracts determine which
of the four treatment groups the employee is in). To investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to this
approach, we follow the estimation approach pursued by Chandra, Gruber and McKnight (2010) in a similar
context. Speci￿cally, we aggregate our employee-level data to the treatment group level and estimate the
treatment group by quarter data using Generalized Least Squares (GLS), with a treatment-group speci￿c
auto correlation parameter and variance. Column (3) of Table A4 reports the results of this estimation; for
comparison purposes, column (2) reproduces the results of the quarterly OLS estimation of the employee-
level regression, with clustering at the union level (see Table A2, column (1)). We are reassured that these
two speci￿cations yield not only similar point estimates (-$147.8 in column (2) and -$164.4 in column (3))
but also very similar standard errors; indeed, the standard errors are slightly smaller in the GLS speci￿cation
than in our baseline OLS speci￿cation.
Appendix B: Sampling algorithm
Throughout, we will let Y denote the data. ￿ = (￿1;￿2) is the set of parameters. We will write ￿￿￿ for all
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Suppose now that we have some initial draws of the parameters. We sample each parameter conditional
on the others and the data as follows.
￿ Draw ￿ = (￿!;￿ ;￿￿;￿￿)j￿￿￿;!i; i;￿it;￿it;￿i;Y . Given !i; i;￿it;￿it;￿i;￿i, the vector ￿ does not
enter the density of the data. Spending depends only on (￿it;!i) and plan choices depend only on
(￿￿;it;￿i;￿i;!i; i). Therefore, the distribution of ￿j￿￿￿;!i; i;￿it;￿￿;it;;￿i;￿i;Y does not depend
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With a N(￿0;V0) prior, the posterior of ￿ would be
N(￿ ￿;
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￿ Draw ￿j￿￿￿;Y . In order to impose the restrictions on ￿ above (for example, that cov(￿￿;2003;!) =
cov(￿￿;2004;!) and cov(￿￿;2003; ) = cov(￿￿;2004; )), we sample ￿ in various pieces. To do this, it is
useful to de￿ne ￿ as the coe¢ cient from regressing ￿￿;it ￿ x￿




















Using this notation, we can write
￿￿;it ￿ x￿
it￿￿ = ￿!(log!i ￿ x!
i ￿!) + ￿ (log i ￿ x
 
i ￿ ) + ￿it (28)
60Where ￿it is normally distributed and independent of log!￿x!￿! and log ￿x ￿ . We parameterize















That is, we think of ￿ as coming from an AR(1) process. Note that for T = 2, as in our baseline model,
specifying that ￿ follows an AR(1) process carries no restriction ￿we could just as well simply say that
￿ has some variance matrix. However, our sampling algorithm and code are written for generic T, and
for T ￿ 3, the AR(1) assumption is a meaningful restriction.







Aj￿￿￿;Y . As above, the posterior of ￿!;  given the latent variables
and the data does not depend on the data. Standard calculations show that if the prior for ￿!; 
is IW(A;m) then its posterior is IW
￿
n^ ￿!;  + A;n + m
￿
where






















￿ Draw ￿j￿￿￿;!i; i;￿it;￿i;￿i;Y . As above, the posterior of ￿ given the latent variables and the
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where ~ yit = (￿it ￿ x￿








A. The usual calculations would show that
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￿;!i; i;￿it;￿i;￿i;Y . The same reasoning as for ￿ shows that with a ￿(a1;a2) prior,
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￿ Draw ￿j￿￿￿;￿it!i; i;￿it;￿i;Y . As above, the posterior of ￿ given the latent variables and the
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, so ￿ has the density of a normal truncated to [￿1;1] and






This leads to an acceptance rate between 0.3 and 0.5 for a wide range of sample sizes.
￿ Draw ￿it;!ij￿￿￿;￿!;Y . This means drawing ￿;! from the region that rationalizes the observed choices
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￿1
￿; S(￿; );! with
￿ = ￿
￿1
￿; S(￿; );! and S(￿; );! the vector of covariances between ! and (￿; ) and ￿￿;  the variance
of (￿; ). We can do accept-reject sampling to sample from the region where j￿(!; ;￿;￿;￿) = J.
However, the area where m￿(￿;!) = m has measure zero, so accept-reject sampling will not work.
Instead, we have to more carefully characterize spending(￿;!) to sample from the appropriate area.
Let d be the chosen plan￿ s deductible, x the maximum out of pocket sending, and c the copayment
rate. A person chooses m to maximize utility:
max
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x d + c(m ￿ d) ￿ x
(36)
There are four possible solutions for m: 0, ￿, ￿+(1￿c)!, and ￿+!. We check whether each of these
satisfy the constraints in (36) and compare the utilities of the ones that do.
We sample from the distribution of the latent variables subject to m￿(￿;!) = m using a Metropolis-
47We tried to sample from this density using rejection sampling. We drew ￿
￿ ￿ TN(^ ￿;v￿;￿1;1) and accepted with
probability (1 ￿ ￿
2)
N=2, unfortunately this leads to unacceptably low acceptance rates.
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We sample from this density by:
1. Sample





























We sample from this density using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a normal candidate
density for log!. For each draw of !i, we run ￿ve metropolis iterations.
2. If mit = 0 for any t, draw log￿it ￿ N(￿￿;it;￿￿;i).
3. If 0 < mit < d, set ￿it = mit
4. Accept !i if the observed mit is the solution to (36) and jit = j￿(!i; i;￿￿;it;￿￿;i;￿i) for all t,
else repeat.
￿ For t = 2003;2004, draw ￿itj￿￿￿;Y . The posterior is a normal distribution truncated to the region
where the choices implied by the model match the choices in the data. We repeatedly draw from this
normal distribution until the choices match. The joint distribution of log i;log!i;f￿isg;log(￿it ￿￿i)



















































Note that we do not need to condition on log￿is for s 6= t, because conditional on ￿is, ￿it and log￿is
are independent. Let C￿t;(!; ;￿s;￿t) be the vector of covariances between ￿it and the other latent









































63The posterior mean of ￿it is then ei￿i with ￿i = C￿t;(!; ;￿s;￿)V
￿1






￿ Draw  ij￿￿ ;Y . As with ￿it, the posterior will be a normal distribution truncated to the region
where the choices implied by the model match the choices in the data. We repeatedly draw from this
normal distribution until the choices match. De￿ne ei as when sampling ￿it, but leave out ￿it. Also,
let C ;(!;￿) be the vector of covariances of   and (!;￿) and ￿￿  be ￿ with the row and column for












￿ Draw ￿ij￿￿￿i;Y .























So the posterior of ￿
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1 ￿ F￿(￿ ￿￿2;k;￿1)
p(￿1)











￿1;0 ￿ (1 ￿ F￿(￿ ￿￿2;k;￿1))￿N
where the prior for 1=￿1 is ￿(k0;￿1;0). This is a gamma distribution times some weighting function.







Given the current estimates, 1￿F￿(￿ ￿￿2;k;￿1) is very close to one, so this metropolis sampler accepts
nearly all draws.



















￿(k)N p(k)(1 ￿ F￿(￿ ￿￿2;k;￿))￿N
which is a nonstandard distribution. We use the adaptive rejection metropolis sampling (ARMS)
method of Gilks, Best, and Tan (1995) to sample from it. This is a hybrid accept-reject and metropolis
sampling scheme. It is designed to sample from log-concave and nearly log-concave densities e¢ ciently.
Without the (1 ￿ F￿(￿ ￿￿2;k;￿))￿N term, this density would be log-concave (it may be log-concave
anyway), and ARMS can sample from it very e¢ ciently.






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-591.81 -220.37 -310.32 -116.69 55.91 -1.94 -0.0005 -0.017
(264.26) (69.32) (137.89) (246.17) (69.34) (0.37) (0.27) (0.011)
[0.034] [0.004] [0.033] [0.639] [0.427] [0.000] [0.999] [0.155]




The table shows the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate of the impact of the move from the old to the new
options on various components of health care spending and utilization. All columns show the coe¢ cient
on TREAT from estimating equation 17 by OLS for the dependent variable given in the column heading. Unit of
observation is an employee-year. All regressions include year and treatment group ￿xed e⁄ects. We classify
employees into one of four possible treatment groups - switched in 2004, switched in 2005, switched in 2006,
or switched later - based on his union a¢ liation which determines the year in which he is switched to the new
health insurance options. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for an arbitrary variance-covariance
matrix within each of the 28 unions; p-values are in [square brackets].Sample is 2003-2006. N = 14,638.














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TREATjt -147.87 -139.44 -156.85 -157.54 -185.65
(66.04) (85.22) (43.60) (50.49) (74.82)
[0.034] [0.113] [0.001] [0.004] [0.020]





















Total Spending, Censored at 99th percentile
1125
The table shows the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate of the impact of the move from the old to the new
options. Speci￿cally, columns 1 through 5 show the results from estimating equation 18 (and column
6 shows results from estimating equation 19) by OLS for the dependent variable total quarterly health
spending. Unit of observation is an employee-quarter. The variable TREATjt is an indicator variable for
whether treatment group j is o⁄ered the new health insurance options in quarter t: The variable Treatjt;0 is an
indicator variable for whether it is the quarter before group j is switched to the new health insurance options. The
variable TREATjt;k is an indicator variable for whether it is k quarters since quarter 0 (i.e. the quarter before the
switch). All regressions include quarter and treatment group ￿xed e⁄ects; column 5 also includes a treatment
group-speci￿c linear trend. We classify employees into one of four possible treatment groups - switched in
2004, switched in 2005, switched in 2006, or switched later - based on his union a¢ liation which determines
the year in which he is switched to the new health insurance options. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
adjusted for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each of the 28 unions; p-values are in [square
brackets].Sample is 2003-2006. N = 58,552.













At Alcoa all four
years, w individual
fixed effects.
(3) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TREATjt -591.81 -522.74 -537.96 -965.92 -965.92
(264.26) (267.29) (264.33) (302.33) (349.04)






The table examines the sensitivity of the annual di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates of the impact of the move
from the old to the new options on total annual medical spending. All columns show the coe¢ cient on
TREAT from estimating equation 17 by OLS for the dependent variable total annual medical spending. Unit of
observation is an employee-year. All regressions include quarter and treatment group ￿xed e⁄ects. We classify
employees into one of four possible treatment groups - switched in 2004, switched in 2005, switched in 2006,
or switched later - based on his union a¢ liation which determines the year in which he is switched to the new
health insurance options. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for an arbitrary variance-covariance
matrix within each of the 28 unions; p-values are in [square brackets].Sample is 2003-2006. Column 1
replicates the baseline results (from Table 6, column 4). In column 2 we control for coverage tier. In column
3 we control for coverage tier, employee age, risk score, employee gender, number of dependents insured on
the policy, whether the employee is white, the number of years the employee has been at Alcoa, and the
employee￿ s annual salary. Column 4 limits the sample to employees who are at Alcoa (and in our data) for
all four years. Column 5 adds employee ￿xed e⁄ects to the sample in column 4.







TREATjt -0.021 -147.87 -166.43
(0.024) (66.04) (61.22)
[0.376] [0.034] [0.007]
Mean dep var 0.106 1348 1364
N 16366 58,552 64
Dependent
variable:  choose a
non-PPO option
Dependent variable: total spending
The table examines some additional sensitivity of the annual di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates of the impact
of the move from the old to the new options on total annual medical spending. All regressions include year
and treatment group ￿xed e⁄ects. Column 1 shows the coe¢ cient on TREAT from estimating equation 17
by OLS on the baseline 2003-2006 sample, plus the employees who choose a non-PPO option; the dependent variable
is an indicator variable for whether the employee chose a non PPO option; unit of observation is an employee-year.
In columns 2 and 3 the dependent variable is total spending. Column 2 shows the coe¢ cient on TREAT from
estimating equation 18 by OLS at the employee-quarter level. Column 3 shows the coe¢ cient on TREAT
from estimating equation 18 by GLS with a panel-speci￿c auto correlation parameter and variance at the
treatment group - quarter level. In columns 1 and 2 standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for an
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each of the 28 unions; p-values are in [square brackets].
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